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Network Security Web-App-Sec
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Re: [WEB SECURITY] SSL does not = a secure website

Subject: Re: [WEB SECURITY] SSL does not = a secure website
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 10:41:46 -0500
Ryan Barnett wrote:
Lyal,
My comments about SSL not equating to a "secure site" was not directed
at the PCI standard but rather those uninformed individuals who think
that implementing SSL and posting a banner on their site has magically
solved their web security problems.
 
Here is a perfect, personal example of what I mean.  This is a small
excerpt from my book -
 

*/We're Secure Because We Use SSL: Missing the Point/*

Back in February 2004, I decided make an online purchase of some herbal
packs that can be heated in the microwave and used to threat sore
muscles.   When I visited the manufactures website, I was dutifully
greeting with a message "We are a secure website!  We use 128-bit SSL
Encryption."  This was reassuring.  During my checkout process, I
decided to verify some general SSL info about the connection.  I
double-clicked on the "lock" in the lower-right hand corner of my web
browser and verified that the domain name associated with the SSL
certificate matched the URL domain that I was visiting, that it was
signed by a reputable Certificate Authority such as VeriSign and,
finally, that the certificate was still valid.  Everything seemed in
order so I proceeded with the checkout process and entered my credit
card data.   I hit the submit button and was then presented with a
message that made my stomach tighten up.  The message is displayed
below, however I have edited some of the information to obscure the both
the company and my credit card data.

The following email message was sent.
<big snip>

    So as I think about this question, it seems that PCI should be
    considered in its entirety, not just single sections, when it comes
    to addressing risks.
     

I suspect that the merchant in your example was not and may still not be
big enough to be required to meet the PCI requirements.  Which brings up
a problem with the PCI requirements: how does a user know that they are
at a site which has met the PCI requirements?

Nick

-- 
Nick Owen
WiKID Systems, Inc.
404.962.8983
http://www.wikidsystems.com
Commercial/Open Source Two-Factor Authentication
https://www.linkedin.com/in/nickowen

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