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RE: limits of end-user "testing"

Subject: RE: limits of end-user "testing"
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2005 09:39:30 -0500
 

This doesn't prevent phishing per se. I can setup a phishing site that
acts as a man in the middle proxy to the > > bank's site. You log into my
site, I log into the bank's site, get a challenge, send the number to you
the   
victim, you reply and I forward it to the bank, voila.

I had a conversation with a 2-factor authentication vendor a few weeks ago
about this.  His comment was that this kind of thing was possible, but the
damage that can be done is mitigated by the bank's fraud detection systems.
If a phisher were to compromise an account they would only have one session
to conduct any fraudulent transactions and this type of activity is easily
spotted by most banks' fraud systems.  If an attacker wanted to evade the
fraud detection systems they'd have to conduct small transactions over
multiple sessions, which isn't possible with one-time password type
authentication (unless they can phish the credentials multiple times).  

This makes sense to me, but can anyone confirm that banks fraud detection
systems are this good?

Luke

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