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Re: Script Based Attacks & Form Hacks

Subject: Re: Script Based Attacks & Form Hacks
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2005 09:54:51 +0000

Hi Saqib,

On 22 Jul 2005, at 00:44, Saqib Ali wrote:

<snip>

2) This type are a little harder to foil. However not impossible. For
external facing applications, I always send an email for
validation/verification. Till the user authenticates his/her address,
I keep the form data in a temporary table. The enteries in the temp
table have a life time of 1 hour, after that they get deleted. Also
make the email address / IP address the primary key in your temp
table. This will prevent one single machine from filling up the temp
table. It would have to be DDOS attack to fill up the TEMP table. But
then again, I set a max limit on the number of entries in the temp
table.

This type of defense is likely to deter the casual attacker from attempting an automated attack, but
it does not present an insurmountable hurdle since there is nothing in the system that can't be automated.
It would be relatively simple for an attacker to control an email server(s) and therefore to be able to automate the process of parsing and responding to predictable emails.
Basing a defense on the IP address of the submitter is also not really reliable because of the relative ease with which an attacker can use proxies to submit requests (http://proxy.org/lists.shtml).
I don't see how the limit on the temp table provides any degree of protection, since once this table is filled with bogus data, legitimate users will not be allowed to submit forms - which is an effective denial of service condition in itself.


regards,
Stephen

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