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Re: Any security issue with using SPNEGOto perform single-sign-on?

Subject: Re: Any security issue with using SPNEGOto perform single-sign-on?
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 13:07:37 +0000
Hi,

In principle I would worry that there's a risk of phishing style attacks where users are lured to visit a fake site, which harvests their details. Now, I think this is mitigated, because credentials are only given to sites in the intranet zone, and the server name is included in the kerberos principal. But still, this is an attack angle I'd give some thought. For example, can an attacker who has harvested a single ticket then perform an offline password brute force attack?

I agree, CSRF is a problem with any authentication scheme where the browser automatically attached the credentials. For now you'll have to rely on the application-layer workaround of having random tokens in forms. I've just been musing that browsers could provide this protection with a simple rule: for POST requests, where the originating form is a different (hostname, protocol) to the target, do not attach any credentials. Provided people followed the HTTP spec (i.e. only do actions on POST requests), this would provide decent protection and I don't think it would break much.

A general worry I have is SSO is that there is no longer a logout function. It's considered good practice to provide a logout function, so a user can be reasonably sure their session really has finished and no further actions can occur. I guess the browser could do this - it would prompt the first time it sends credentials to a site, after that automatically send credentials without asking, until the user selects some kind of logout function. I don't think any browsers support this, but it could work.

Regards,

Paul


Saqib Ali wrote:

I was wondering if anyone has encountered any security concern/issues
while implementing SPNEGO <
http://www.vintela.com/resources/topics/spnego/ >.  SPNEGO provides a
single-sign-on in a KERBEROS enabled environment. Basically it allows
web applications to automatically authenticate clients who have valid
Kerberos credentials.

I am planning to install the mod_spnego module on a apache server,
that will enable the client to single-sign-on to our internal
application, if they are part of our AD.

I possible concern is the increase of CSRF type of attacks, but that
is the case with any single-sign-on solution.




-- Paul Johnston, GSEC Internet Security Specialist Westpoint Limited Albion Wharf, 19 Albion Street, Manchester, M1 5LN England Tel: +44 (0)161 237 1028 Fax: +44 (0)161 237 1031 email: paul@westpoint.ltd.uk web: www.westpoint.ltd.uk

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