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| Subject: | RE: Preventing direct URL access in a J2EE environment |
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| Date: | Thu, 3 Mar 2005 16:46:37 -0600 |
Kevin, Per Paul below, he rather eloquently summed this up but I will add some minutia: 1. Google for CSRF web application for more security related info as opposed to anti-leeching. 2. Paul distinguishes stateful vs. crypto auth tokens. I think we use different terminology for the same ideas which is simply: 3. Simple terms to use are Static Authorization Tokens (SATs), and Dynamic Authorization Tokens (DATs). Static would be a reusable hash which is preferable from a resource standpoint, and dynamic would be a one-time token that cryptographically secure and is significantly stronger in terms of forcing authorization. Use in cookies is self-defeating. Use in form fields is ideal and provides an application with the least attack surface. All sensitive functions must then be postable forms. Use of DATs in URLs is better than nothing, limiting CSRF, limiting most URL-based script injection like URL parameter XSS, and limiting workflow bypasses by enforcing 'explicit entrypoints', like you expressed concern for having. Use of SATs or DATs in URLs does significantly increase attack surface as they can be subject to scripted brute force by CSRF, they are stored in web logs by default, and passed in refer fields. 4. Browser "back" button: if you implement a ReturnURL parameter in your application and issue a unique DAT to ReturnURL like you would for the rest of your links/forms, there is a way to maintain use of the Back button. When a user requests an URL with a dead token you can redirect them to the application entrypoint, which can read the ReturnURL parameter and if there's a valid link+SAT/DAT, load the originating page. 5. I'll be releasing a paper on this later this month distinguishing session from auth tokens and talking about all the different ways these can be used, pros and cons, etc., if you are still in the market for info at that time. Arian
-----Original Message----- From: Paul Johnston [mailto:paul@westpoint.ltd.uk] Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2005 4:54 AM To: Kevin Conaway Cc: webappsec@securityfocus.com Subject: Re: Preventing direct URL access in a J2EE environment Kevin, I'd say you have two likely options: 1) Statefully store authorization tokens When a page is requested, random numbers are generated for each URL it links to. These are included in the generated URL and also stored in the user's session. Incoming requests have the auth token checked against the session, and auth tokens are removed from the session once used. You probably want 128-bit tokens to prevent brute force attacks. 2) Use cryptographic auth tokens Similar to (1), but instead of generating random numbers and storing them, use a cryptographic function, e.g. md5(url + username + server_secret). This avoids saving state, but is not as secure as (1), because a user can re-use an auth token several times. You can include a timestamp in the auth token to reduce this, but you can never make it watertight. It's worth taking a moment to think what these restrictions mean to your users: they cannot use the browser's "back" button. They also cannot bookmark pages protected in this way. I could accept this from my bank, but I would get annoyed if my webmail account made such restrictions. I recommend storing these auth tokens either in URLs, hidden form fields or JavaScript variables. If you store them in cookies (or any authentication store that the browser automatically attaches to requests) then your application will be vulnerable to CSRF. Best wishes, Paul Kevin Conaway wrote:For our application, we would like to prevent users from requesting application resources directly. E.g. browsing to http://localhost/app/method.do?id=5&type=3 instead of actually clicking on a link that the application provides. We would like to do this without a major impact on our code. I was thinking of using the following scenario: - Currently we have tag libraries that help build all our URLS. These tag libraries would be modified to include a strong cryptographic token that is unique to each URL/User combination. - The token/URL combination would be stored in the application context for a pre-determined amount of time. - Next, we would use a Servlet filter to intercept the URL. First, deny URLS requested without tokens. If a token is passed, verify that matches the token stored in the application context for the requested URL. For the token, I was considering using SecureRandom to generate a random number and compute a hash of the random number and the URI being requested. This would be stored along with with URI and the user Id. Could anyone point out any pitfalls I need to be aware of, or if I'm going about things the wrong way? Thanks Kevin-- Paul Johnston, GSEC Internet Security Specialist Westpoint Limited Albion Wharf, 19 Albion Street, Manchester, M1 5LN England Tel: +44 (0)161 237 1028 Fax: +44 (0)161 237 1031 email: paul@westpoint.ltd.uk web: www.westpoint.ltd.uk
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