Michael Silk wrote:
Rogan,
The only possible attack against SSL client certs is against the
"re-issue" process, I think, and there again, the bank has control. The
way I see it, the phisher could try to get the user to "renew" their
cert, by providing some authenticating information that the phisher
could try to use to get a new cert from the bank. But, the key here is
"from the BANK".
Could even be as simple as presenting a message such as:
"Our cert system is down, please enter your phone banking details
here to gain access".
I guess that would allow the attacker to hit via the phone banking
services. That is a possibility. Perhaps that could be countered by the
bank displaying a "splash screen" on logon/first page hit, that tells
the user that the banking system will only ever be accessed using the
certificate, and to distrust any messages that say that it is not working.
Another issue with SSL client certs (please correct me if i'm wrong)
is that it's basically sitting on the computer 24/7. If you can gain
access to the machine it's on you (Joe hacker..) can then take it and
use it elsewhere.
Depends. Windows cert store does not make it easy to copy a certificate
if it is not imported with the "exportable" flag set.
Other apps/browsers may make it easier.
And laptops that are used by multiple employee's or family members,
or robbers.. ?
And on this note, it would mean it's fairly difficult for a user to
use their banking from work and home with this setup, isn't it ?
That depends on whether we are using a hardware token or not . . .
With a smart card/USB crypto device, you get portability, as well as
copy protection, although you do pay the "price" of having to set up
driver software in multiple locations . . .
-- Michael
Rogan
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Rogan Dawes
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