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| Subject: | RE: SQL injection (no single quotes used) |
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| Date: | Tue, 21 Dec 2004 18:52:13 +1100 |
Michael, But almost all of the "popular" languages implement it already (aside from php (afaik)). ASP has it (SqlCommand?), .Net has it (SqlCommand), and as you mention, Java has it. The only thing (That I know of) that a PreparedStatement, etc, _can't_ handle is a dynamically-generated "IN" clause. These need to be processed specially. -- Michael (Silk - I'm not talking to myself :)) -- Original Message -- Juan et al, The SQL injection thread seems to crop up every 6 months or so. From the last one, I think that most people agreed that parameterizing the sql was the best and most general choice (via something like Java's PreparedStatement object)-- if you have a good structure like that, then you don't have to worry about injection. If not (and if you don't want to build one), you need to check data-types on all non-quoted datatypes, and escape quotes on all the quoted ones. Then you have to make sure that you account for all of the other encoding styles that the underlying DBMS will handle, and deal with those. Finally, use the principal of least privilege so that the process that usually checks usernames doesn't have authorization to drop tables, etc. I've been waiting for someone to announce cross-language (standard) API that mimic's PreparedStatement. If anyone's looking for something to do, it'd be a great help to the community... Regards, Michael Scovetta Computer Associates Senior Application Developer -----Original Message----- From: Juan Carlos [mailto:johnccr@yahoo.com] Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2004 10:49 AM To: Michael Howard; Adam Tuliper; webappsec@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: SQL injection (no single quotes used) hum... not sure about this, from a web application perspective, all data is handled as plain text, I mean, even if I encode the information in the URL (for example) my java web application (for example), always will get an ' character after calling getParamer. How can en encoded character "touch" the Web Application Software? Does the DB manager does decoding as well?. Cheers -JC --- Michael Howard <mikehow@microsoft.com> escribió:
From my experience, escaping is often never enough, because there a number of attacks that don't use quotes (etc) I'm not saying escaping quotes is bad, it's just not good enough on its own. [Writing Secure Code] http://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/5957.asp [Protect Your PC] http://www.microsoft.com/protect [Blog] http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard [On-line Security Training] http://mste/training/offerings.asp?TrainingID=53074 -----Original Message----- From: Adam Tuliper [mailto:amt@gecko-software.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 11:30 AM To: Juan Carlos Calderon; webappsec@securityfocus.com Subject: Re: SQL injection (no single quotes used) Michael Howard (and David LeBlanc) has a nice section in "writing secure code" about encoding characters. In some cases using char(0x27) as well as using entire words encoded via 0xXXXXXXXXXX can be used. Watching for "'" is not enough. I think Michael is on this list.. any words Michael? On Thu, 9 Dec 2004 09:53:03 -0600 (CST) Juan Carlos Calderon <johnccr@yahoo.com> wrote:Hi all While in Oracle escaping apostrophe (') character seems to be enough protection for Sql Injection (I think is not), this is not true for Sql Server.Here alittle example I think many of you will finduseful.For an on-the-fly query like: Query = "select field1, field2... from table whereid= '" + FixSQL (FieldValue) + "'" Where FixSQL will escape single quotes AKAapostrophe,the following value for "FieldValue" will be effective: FieldValue = "(NewLine)GO(NewLine)Desired Sql Sentence(NewLine)GO" Final result is: select field1, field2... from table where id = ' GO Desired Sql Sentence GO ' Here the MS Documentation for GO Keyword: <snip> SQL Server utilities interpret GO as a signal that they should send the current batch of Transact-SQL statements to SQL Server. The current batch of statements is composed of all statements enteredsincethe last GO, or since the start of the ad hocsessionor script if this is the first GO </snip> So one sentence become three, sentences one andthreewill fail, but sentence two (the one of ourinterest)will execute successfully. Hope you find this interesting Cheers, -JC
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