Ethical Hacking

Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package.
Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute

Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors.




Network Security Web-App-Sec
[Top] [All Lists]

RE: key storage

Subject: RE: key storage
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2004 00:19:33 +1000


On another note, how should the webserver authenticate itself to the
proxy (especially if unattended)?  I have Googled extensively for best
practices in this scenario and come up with lots of vendor fluff but
little hard information.

i believe the webserver i will be using can be made to use x509
certificates and the exchange could take place over SSL
what scares me is speed. this setup will be very slow. since the hash will
be cheked each time and you have no state and wont write the keys to a
file on the webserver, you will establish a connection with the proxy over
SSL each time a request is made.

i think i am just going to have to go with slightly less security and have
the hash key in a file not directly under www root. or maybe i need to
google a little more


Roman Fail


      -----Original Message-----
      From: Brown, James F. [mailto:James.F.Brown@FMR.com]
      Sent: Mon 8/30/2004 7:00 AM
      To: Ajay
      Cc: webappsec@securityfocus.com
      Subject: RE: key storage



      No problem. That's the "best practice", I believe.

      - Jim

      -----Original Message-----
      From: Ajay [mailto:abra9823@mail.usyd.edu.au]
      Sent: Monday, August 30, 2004 9:29 AM
      To: Brown, James F.
      Cc: webappsec@securityfocus.com
      Subject: RE: key storage


      yup, thats the idea. do you see any problems with it

      cheers


      Quoting "Brown, James F." <James.F.Brown@FMR.com>:

      > You're going to use the SHA-1 hash of the passphrase as the actual
key
      > for the symmetric encryption, right?
      >
      > ================================
      > James F. Brown  CISM, CISA
      > Sr. Director, Information Security
      > Fidelity Investments
      > james.f.brown@fmr.com
      > http://www.fidelity.com
      >
      >
      > -----Original Message-----
      > From: Ajay [mailto:abra9823@mail.usyd.edu.au]
      > Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2004 12:25 AM
      > To: Brown, James F.
      > Cc: George Capehart; webappsec@securityfocus.com
      > Subject: RE: key storage
      >
      >
      > thanks.
      > from responses on other mailing lists, i am moving towards the idea
of
      > having some sort of proxy server application which at startup is
      > supplied
      > a passphrase. it uses the passphrase to decrypt a passphrase
encrypted
      > file and loads keys from there. the file itself can be removed then
      > my main application can then query the proxy when it needs the keys.
      > ofcourse this introduces the problem of securing the exchange between
      > the
      > main and the proxy.
      > the reason i have the proxy in the first place is because my main app
      is
      > a
      > bunch of cgi scripts where state is stored by only writing to a file
      and
      > i
      > do not have access to the webserver where the application is hosted.
      > it will all be remarkable slow though...
      >
      > cheers
      >
      > --
      > Ajay Brar,
      >
      > Quoting "Brown, James F." <James.F.Brown@FMR.com>:
      >
      > > Chapter 8 in Applied Cryptography only discussed key storage in
      areas
      > > where users are involved. If you have an server application that
      uses
      > > crypto with no users involved, it doesn't offer much help. I'll
      check
      > > Bruce's newer book "Practical Cryptography" to see if he's
addressed
      > > that topic, but I won't be able to report on it until Monday.
      > >
      > > ================================
      > > James F. Brown  CISM, CISA
      > > Sr. Director, Information Security
      > > Fidelity Investments
      > > james.f.brown@fmr.com
      > > http://www.fidelity.com
      > >
      > >
      > > -----Original Message-----
      > > From: George Capehart [mailto:gwc@acm.org]
      > > Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2004 1:41 PM
      > > To: webappsec@securityfocus.com
      > > Subject: Re: key storage
      > >
      > >
      > > On Wednesday 25 August 2004 21:12, Ajay allegedly wrote:
      > > > and also is there any significant paper on key storage - a
journal
      > or
      > > > conference paper?
      > > > its for my thesis and it would be nice if i could quote a the
      > > > findings of some paper
      > >
      > > Ajay,
      > >
      > > There has been *lots* written about key storage.  It's a pretty
      > > important topic . . . :>  Google is your friend.  A great place to
      > > start, though is Chapter 8 (Key Management) in _Applied_Cryptology
      > > (ISBN 0-471-11709-9) by Bruce Schneier.
      > >
      > > Cheers,
      > >
      > > George Capehart
      > > --
      > > George W. Capehart
      > >
      > > Key fingerprint:  3145 104D 9579 26DA DBC7  CDD0 9AE1 8C9C DD70
34EA
      > >
      > > "With sufficient thrust, pigs fly just fine."  -- RFC 1925






----------------------------------------------------------------
This message was sent using IMP, the Internet Messaging Program.

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>