Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Heap Overflow
http://www.eeye.com/html/research/advisories/AD20060509a.html
Release Date:
May 9, 2006
Date Reported:
October 11, 2005
Patch Development Time (In Days):
210
Severity:
High (Remote Code Execution)
Systems Affected:
Windows NT 4.0
Windows 2000 SP2 and SP3
Overview:
eEye Digital Security has discovered a second vulnerability in the
Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator that could allow an
attacker to take complete control over a vulnerable system to which he
has network or local access. The vulnerable MSDTC component is an RPC
server which is network accessible by default on Windows NT 4.0 Server
and Windows 2000 Server systems, over a dynamic high TCP port.
This vulnerability is separate from the "Microsoft Distributed
Transaction Coordinator Memory Modification Vulnerability" issue we
published in October 2005, most significantly in that this second
vulnerability affects NT 4.0 whereas the previous one did not. The patch
released with Microsoft Security Bulletin MS05-051 resolved both
vulnerabilities, although this patch was not previously released for NT
4.0 or Windows 2000 SP2 or SP3. Windows 2000 SP4 and Windows XP systems
without the MS05-051 hotfix installed are affected as well; Windows
Server 2003 systems are immune.
Technical Details:
MSDTCPRX.DLL functions as an RPC server inside the MSDTC.EXE process,
with a dynamic TCP port as its RPC endpoint and
{906B0CE0-C70B-1067-B317-00DD010662DA} v1.0 as the sole interface it
provides. The function CRpcIoManagerServer::BuildContext, as called from
BuildContextW (opnum 7) on Windows 2000 and Windows XP, and BuildContext
(opnum 1) on Windows NT 4.0, contains a heap overflow vulnerability due
to a lack of input validation. Specifically, it attempts to overwrite
its "pszGuidOut" argument, which corresponds to the fifth string
argument passed into BuildContext / BuildContextW, with a null GUID
string. Because the length of the destination string is not checked
prior to the string copy, the heap block containing the RPC stub data
can be overflowed, potentially corrupting the adjacent heap block.
The vulnerable copy operation is an intrinsic "strcpy(arg_10,
pszNULL_GUID)" on NT 4.0, and a "wcscpy(arg_28, pwszNULL_GUID)" call on
Windows 2000. Although the overwrite data itself is not controllable,
the amount of spillover is, and therefore a carefully engineered
overwrite is able to mutilate the adjacent heap block in an exploitable
way.
Protection:
Retina Network Security Scanner has been updated to identify this
vulnerability. Blink - Endpoint Vulnerability Prevention - preemptively
protects from this vulnerability.
Vendor Status:
Microsoft has released a patch for this vulnerability, but it is only
available to customers who have entered into a custom support agreement
with Microsoft. For more information, please visit:
http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/ProductInfo/Availability/faq.asp#8
Credit:
Derek Soeder
Greetings:
The folks who attended eEye Coast to Coast. Adams Morgan, Georgetown,
and the Capital Grille. The ASCII slide, the BV, and RITD. Mudge, Gene
and Josh, JB, RC, and the Snub. Snow. The exploding pink ball of oozing
doom.
Copyright (c) 1998-2006 eEye Digital Security
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