Ethical Hacking

Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package.
Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute

Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors.




Network Security VulnWatch
[Top] [All Lists]

[Full-disclosure] MSIE (mshtml.dll) OBJECT tag vulnerability

Subject: [Full-disclosure] MSIE (mshtml.dll) OBJECT tag vulnerability
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 01:30:03 +0200 (CEST)
Perhaps not surprisingly, there appears to be a vulnerability in how
Microsoft Internet Explorer handles (or fails to handle) certain
combinations of nested OBJECT tags. This was tested with MSIE
6.0.2900.2180.xpsp.040806-1825 and mshtml.dll 6.00.2900.2873
xpsp_sp2_gdr.060322-1613.

At first sight, this vulnerability may offer a remote compromise vector,
although not necessarily a reliable one. The error is convoluted and
difficult to debug in absence of sources; as such, I cannot offer a
definitive attack scenario, nor rule out that my initial diagnosis will be
proved wrong [*]. As such, panic, but only slightly.

Probably the easiest way to trigger the problem is as follows:

  perl -e '{print "<STYLE></STYLE>\n<OBJECT>\nBork\n"x32}' >test.html

...this will (usually) cause a NULL pointer + fixed offset (eax+0x28)
dereference in mshtml.dll, the pointer being read from allocated but still
zeroed memory region.

The aforementioned condition is not exploitable, but padding the page with
preceeding OBJECT tag (and other tags), increasing the number of nested
OBJECTs, and most importantly, adding bogus 'type=' parameters of various
length to the final sequence of OBJECTs, will cause that dereference to
become non-NULL on many installations; then, a range of other interesting
faults should ensue, including dereferences of variable bogus addresses
close to stack, or crashes later on, when the page is reloaded or closed.

[ In absence of sources, I do not understand the precise underlying
  mechanics of the bug, and I am not inclined to spend hours with a
  debugger to find out. I'm simply judging by the symptoms, but these
  seem to be indicative of an exploitable flaw. ]

Several examples of pages that cause distinct faults in my setup (your
mileage may and probably WILL vary; on three test machines, this worked as
described; on one, all examples behaved in non-exploitable 0x28 way):

  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-1.html (eax=0x0, instant dereference)
  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-2.html (bogus esi on reload/leave)
  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-3.html (page fault on browser close)
  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-4.html (bogus esi on reload/leave)

Well, that's it. Feel free to research this further. This vulnerability,
as requested by customers, is released in strict observance of the Patch
Wednesday & Bug Saturday policy.

[*] The ability of the attacker to document the attack scenario probably
    doesn't matter for those who pretend to care; cryptic "hi" to
    Secunia and their standards of conduct.

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>
  • [Full-disclosure] MSIE (mshtml.dll) OBJECT tag vulnerability, Michal Zalewski <=