Ethical Hacking

Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package.
Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute

Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors.




Network Security VulnWatch
[Top] [All Lists]

[Full-disclosure] xmysqladmin insecure temporary file creation

Subject: [Full-disclosure] xmysqladmin insecure temporary file creation
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2005 10:17:38 +0200
#########################################################

xmysqladmin insecure temporary file creation

Vendor:  Gilbert Therrien gilbert@ican.net or mysql@tcx.se
Advisory: http://www.zataz.net/adviso/xmysqladmin-05292005.txt
Vendor informed: yes
Exploit available: yes
Impact : low
Exploitation : low

#########################################################

xmysqladmin contain a security flaw wich could allow a malicious
local user to delete arbitrary files with the right off the user
how use xmysqladmin or to get sensible informations
(content off a database)

During the drop off a database, xmysqladmin drop the database and create a tar.gz
inside /tmp without checking if the file exist already.


The exploitation require that the malicious local user no wich database
gonna be deleted.

##########
Versions:
##########

xmysqladmin <= 1.0

##########
Solution:
##########

In Makefile :

BACKUPDIR = .

I think that upstream should check if the file already exist or not before creating it.

To prevent symlink attack use kernel patch such as grsecurity

#########
Timeline:
#########

Discovered : 2005-05-24
Vendor notified : 2005-05-29
Vendor response : no reponse
Vendor fix : no fix
Disclosure :  2005-05-29

#####################
Technical details :
#####################

Vulnerable code :
-----------------

In Makefile :

BACKUPDIR = /tmp

In createDropDB.c : begin line 94

void dropdb_drop(FL_OBJECT *obj, long data)
{
  char *cmd;

if(!fl_show_question("WARNING!!!\nThis database will be delete.\nDo you want to continue?", 0))
return;
if(!fl_show_question("WARNING!!!\nThis database will be delete.\nAre you sure?", 0))
return;


  cmd = (char *) malloc(2048);
  if(!cmd) return;

sprintf(cmd, "%s %s/%s.tar%s %s%s/*", BACKUP, BACKUPDIR, g_dropdb_dbfname,
BACKUPSUFFIX, Setup.datapath, g_dropdb_dbfname);


  fl_show_command_log(FL_TRANSIENT);
  fl_exe_command(cmd, 1);
  free(cmd);

{
MYSQL connection;
if(g_mysql_connect(&connection, Setup.host, Setup.user, Setup.password))
{
if(mysql_drop_db(&connection, g_dropdb_dbfname))
{
fl_show_alert(mysql_error(&connection),"","",0);
}
else
{
fl_show_message("The database",g_dropdb_dbfname,"has been destroyed");
}


      mysql_close(&connection);
    }
    else
      {
          fl_show_alert("Cannot connect to server","","",0);
      }
  }

#########
Related :
#########

Bug report : http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93792

#####################
Credits :
#####################

Eric Romang (eromang@zataz.net - ZATAZ Audit)
Thxs to Gentoo Security Team. (Taviso, jaervosz, solar, etc.)

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>
  • [Full-disclosure] xmysqladmin insecure temporary file creation, ZATAZ Audits <=