Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | Re: Remove all admin->root authorization prompts from OSX |
|---|---|
| Date: | Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:39:37 +0000 |
"Explain to me how this is a MacOS specific bug? I can duplicate this behavior on my debian linux machine."
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395142/30/0/threaded
John On Jan 25, 2007, at 6:34 PM, Marvin Simkin wrote:
I respectfully disagree with this proposal and maybe we should discuss it.
Being a member of the admin group is NOT 100% equal to being root. Therefore when you switch from admin group to uid=0 you are escalating privileges. A trojan that gets control of an admin's session should not be able to escalate itself to root without a password prompt, which requires a human to decide (rightly or wrongly...) yes I do want to increase the authority of this process.
Sure, an admin should be smart enough not to get trojaned, but what if they do anyway?
Maybe a cracker could write a trojan that esclates itself using the powers of the admin group, but why make it easier for those who don't know how?
The myth that it should be easy for uneducated users to expose their computers to harm is one reason why certain other GUI platforms have so many security problems.
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ id
uid=505(sysmsimkin) gid=505(sysmsimkin) groups=505(sysmsimkin), 81 (appserveradm), 79(appserverusr), 80(admin)
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ ls -ld /tmp1
drwxr-xr-x 3 501 admin 102 Jun 28 2006 /tmp1
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ mkdir /tmp1/tmp2
mkdir: /tmp1/tmp2: Permission denied
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ /usr/bin/sudo /bin/bash
Password:
host:/tmp1 root# mkdir /tmp1/tmp2
host:/tmp1 root# ls -ld /tmp1/tmp2
drwxr-xr-x 2 root admin 68 Jan 25 11:20 /tmp1/tmp2
host:/tmp1 root# exit
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ rmdir /tmp1/tmp2
rmdir: /tmp1/tmp2: Permission denied
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ /usr/bin/sudo /bin/bash
host:/tmp1 root# rmdir /tmp1/tmp2
host:/tmp1 root# exit
host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$
More interesting (to me) why wasn't I prompted for a password the second time? (Yes I know it was designed that way, I'm asking was that the right decision.) Presumably there is a window of vulnerability for a few minutes AFTER you have been root during which you could fall victim to a trojan.
------------------------------------- Marvin Simkin Planetary Geology Group School of Earth and Space Exploration Arizona State University http://simkin.asu.edu/
-----Original Message----- From: K F (lists) [mailto:kf_lists@digitalmunition.com] Sent: Wed 2007-01-24 18:20 To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: Remove all admin->root authorization prompts from OSX
http://www.petitiononline.com/31337OSX/petition.html
-KF
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | Re: Remove all admin->root authorization prompts from OSX, Ben Bucksch |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | [Full-disclosure] [USN-398-4] Firefox regression, Kees Cook |
| Previous by Thread: | Re: Remove all admin->root authorization prompts from OSX, Ben Bucksch |
| Next by Thread: | Re: Remove all admin->root authorization prompts from OSX, A. Shaw |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |