Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | Re: [Full-disclosure] PocketPC MMS - Remote Code Injection/Execution Vulnerability and Denial-of-Service |
|---|---|
| Date: | Sun, 31 Dec 2006 13:08:10 +0100 |
The proof-of-concept exploit was released at the 23rd Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin, Germany get the PoC and all required tools at: http://www.mulliner.org/pocketpc/ Collin On Thu, 2006-08-10 at 11:28 -0700, Collin R. Mulliner wrote:
Vulnerability Report
-----------------------------
Vendor: Microsoft and ArcSoft
Product: PocketPC OS and MMS Composer
Version(s): MMS Composer: 1.5.5.6, 2.0.0.13 (possible others)
Platform: PocketPC (tested on: WinCE 4.2 and WinCE 4.21, possible
others)
Architecture: ARM
Device(s): HP iPAQ h6315, i-mate PDA2k (OEM: HTC BlueAngle) (possible
others)
Application: MMS User Agent (Inbox application)
Application binary: tmail.exe
-----------------------------
Reporter(s): Collin Mulliner <mulliner@cs.ucsb.edu> (technical contact)
Prof. Giovanni Vigna <vigna@cs.ucsb.edu>
Affiliation: Reliable Software Group, University of California Santa
Barbara
-----------------------------
Executive Summary:
Multiple buffer overflows in MMS parsing code, allow
denial-of-service and REMOTE CODE INJECTION/EXECUTION via MMS.
-----------------------------
Disclosure Time Line:
July 12. 2006 : Vulnerability Report to ArcSoft and Microsoft
July 19. 2006 : Reply by ArcSoft and Microsoft
Aug. 02. 2006 : Vendor Provides Bug Fix to OEMs
Aug. 04. 2006 : Public Disclosure at DEFCON-14
-----------------------------
BugFix:
BugFix is awaiting approval by OEMs
-----------------------------
Brief Technical Details:
1.0) UDP port 2948 open on all interfaces
Devices accept WAPPush via UDP port 2948 on the wireless LAN (Wi-Fi)
interface. This is unnecessary and can be used for Denial-of-Service
attacks.
-----------------------------
2.0) Multiple buffer overflows in MMS message parser
MMS Message parts:
2.1) M-Notification.ind
2.2) M-Retrieve.conf (Header)
2.3) M-Retrieve.conf (Body)
2.4) SMIL parser (Message display function)
-----------------------------
2.1) Parser for M-Notification.ind
Buffer overflows in handlers for the following header fields:
1) TransactionID
2) Subject
3) ContentLocation
Application crashes. Non-critical. Denial-of-Service attack possible.
Exploitable via UDP port 2948.
Categorization: MEDIUM (denial-of-service via wireless LAN)
Exploit: Proof-of-Concept available (DoS)
-----------------------------
2.2) Parser for M-Retrieve.conf (Header)
Buffer overflows in handlers for the following header fields:
1) Subject
2) Content-Type (can overwrite return address on stack)
3) start-info parameter of content-type
Application crashes.
Categorization: LOW (exploitation requires control of MMS
infrastructure)
-----------------------------
2.3) Parser for M-Retrieve.conf (Body)
Buffer overflows in handlers for the following body fields:
Multi-Part Entry header:
1) Content-Type
2) Content-ID
3) ContentLocation
In all cases it is possible to overwrite the return address.
Categorization: LOW (exploitation requires control of MMS
infrastructure)
-----------------------------
2.4) Parser for SMIL (Message display function)
Transported in: M-Retrieve.conf body content
Buffer overflows in handlers for the following parameters:
1) ID parameter of REGION tag
ID="CONTENT" CONTENT is copied into stack-based variable, CONTENT
can be arbitrary long.
2) REGION parameter of TEXT tag
REGION="CONTENT" CONTENT is copied into stack-based variable,
CONTENT can be arbitrary long.
Both overflows allow one to overwrite the return address on the
stack. Both are exploitable and we were able to create a
proof-of-concept exploit. The exploit is triggered by viewing the
malicious MMS message (this is different from other exploits that
require substantial user interaction -- e.g., to install a program).
Overflow happens after 300 bytes in version 1.5.5.6 and after 400
bytes in version 2.0.0.13.
Categorization: CRITICAL (REMOTE CODE EXECUTION)
Exploit: Proof-of-Concept available (code execution)
-----------------------------
Related DEFCON-14 slides and Proof-of-Concept DoS tool are available
here:
http://www.mulliner.org/pocketpc/
-- Collin R. Mulliner <collin@betaversion.net> BETAVERSiON Systems [www.betaversion.net] info/pgp: finger collin@betaversion.net Forget object orientation! _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | Enigma WordPress Bridge (boarddir) Remote File Include, xorontr |
|---|---|
| Previous by Thread: | Enigma WordPress Bridge (boarddir) Remote File Include, xorontr |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |