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Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account

Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2004 03:43:11 -0400 (EDT)
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On Tue, 21 Sep 2004 pressinfo@diebold.com wrote:

Diebold strongly refutes the existence of any "back doors" or "hidden codes" in 
its GEMS software.  These inaccurate allegations appear to stem from those not familiar with the 
product, misunderstanding the purpose of legitimate structures in the database.  These structures 
are well documented and have been reviewed (including at a source code level) by independent 
testing authorities as required by federal election regulations.

In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting machine following an election. The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the election management software would be immediately discovered during this audit process, as this total would not match the true official total tabulated from each machine.
==================

oops, looks like no one told you that this is a forum of computer security professionals who understand the difference between a insecure machine and a press release. you can "strongly refute" all you want: until the code is available for public scrutiny it will remain suspect. but if it's written as poorly as is rumored, exposing it to public scrutiny would only confirm that it's insecure either through carelessness or intent.


...atom

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        "I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral
         votes to the president [Bush] next year"
                -- Walden O'Dell, CEO of Diebold
                August 2003
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