Alright, I'll bite. After reading the blackboxvoting.org allegations,
and your response, I have a few more questions I'd like to see
answered. I'll take them point-for-point from your response:
On Tue, 2004-09-21 at 08:05, pressinfo@diebold.com wrote:
In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@www.securityfocus.com>
Diebold strongly refutes the existence of any "back doors" or "hidden
codes" in its GEMS software.
Please explain the purpose of leaving in the apparent debug mode that
blackboxvoting has described. If the mechanism described is not a debug
mode, what does it do, and why would it be in production software?
These inaccurate allegations appear to stem from those not familiar
with the product, misunderstanding the purpose of legitimate structures
in the database. These structures are well documented...
Can you please provide a link to this documentation, and perhaps an
explanation that offers more detail as to why you believe blackboxvoting
is wrong?
and have been reviewed (including at a source code level) by
independent testing authorities as required by federal election
regulations.
Leaving aside the question of who paid these "independent testing
authorities," I would kindly suggest that if there is any mechanism
which the US public should be allowed to subject to a high degree of
scrutiny, it would be the mechanism by which we elect the people who
will be making decisions for us. There was no question as to how
punchcard machines worked - anybody with a screwdriver and some
mechanical aptitude could figure that out in a very short time. The
problem wasn't with how they worked; it was how well they worked that
led to grief. However, as a voter and a US citizen, I do feel that I'd
like to have the right to get my own second opinion on your software,
including any versions certified after the infamous GEMS code leak.
Please provide all GEMS sourcecode to the US public for further
examination.
In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic
record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting
machine following an election.
The key problem here is that this paper record is created >after< the
election, leaving voters at the whim of any compromise that may occur to
a given machine >during< the election. In a paper ballot situation, the
ballot box sits in plain sight during the entire election, and is
physically locked at the close of the election. In the case of your
system, each voting booth takes the place of the ballot box for the
duration of the election, and is hidden behind a curtain or partition
with many anonymous people during this process. For the voter, there is
no guarantee that what is being stored to computer memory has anything
to do with the selections he or she just made, and no paper trail is
created until often hours after a voter has left the polling area.
Without an immediate paper trail being generated, the voter is at the
whim of whatever software happens to be loaded onto the touchscreen
computer in front of him or her.
The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and
thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once
the audit is complete, the official winners are announced. Any alleged
changes to a vote count in the election management software would be
immediately discovered during this audit process, as this total would
not match the true official total tabulated from each machine.
Again, this makes the assumption that the totals printed out of the
machine after all the voters have left would correctly reflect the
intent and belief of the voters who used it.
Unfortunately, without a voter-verifiable paper trail, it is possible
for a successful attack to occur. Without the minimal safeguards
mentioned above, this attack could go undetected. Regardless of how
many votes are compromised, any stolen vote is too many. Please take
the neccessary steps to ensure the complete integrety of the US election
process.
From: "Jrme" ATHIAS <jerome.athias@caramail.com>
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor
Account
Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:38:05 -0400
Subject: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78
BlackBoxVoting.org reported a vulnerability in the Diebold GEMS
central tabulator.
A local authenticated user can enter a two-digit code in a certain
"hidden" location
to cause a second set of votes to be created on the system. This
second set of votes
can be modified by the local user and then read by the voting system
as legitimate
votes, the report said.
GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, and GEMS 1.18.23 are affected.
The vendor was reportedly notified on July 8, 2003.
Solution: No vendor solution was available at the time of this
entry.
Vendor URL: www.diebold.com/dieboldes/GEMS.htm (Links to External
Site)
