Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

pressinfo@diebold.com wrote:

> <>In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@www.securityfocus.com>
>
> In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic 
> record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting 
> machine following an election. The results from each individual 
> machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard 
> election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official 
> winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the 
> election management software would be immediately discovered during 
> this audit process, as this total would not match the true official 
> total tabulated from each machine.


Something with a legitimate purpose may not always be used in a 
legitimate fashion. If "legitimate" features exist which could pervert 
the primary purpose of the system -- to accurately record and collate 
votes -- and those features could forseeably be used in such a way with 
the collusion of only a small number of individuals, then that system is 
broken.

Your second point here has got nothing to do with security of the GEMS 
software -- it's talking about election processes as a whole, of which 
the software is only a part. The assumption in the design and 
implementation of your voting machines and software should be that the 
other parts of the process might *not* work, not that they are perfect 
and will excuse any flaws in your system.

Craig.