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Network Security Snort-Signatures
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Re: [Snort-sigs] [Emerging-Sigs] For Instance: Hostile FTP Sigs

Subject: Re: [Snort-sigs] [Emerging-Sigs] For Instance: Hostile FTP Sigs
Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2007 11:07:58 -0500
i've got to fix this subscribed address problem. sry for the resend.

Jason Brvenik wrote:

Matt Jonkman wrote:
Brian Caswell wrote:
Why write 9 extra rules when a tag on this 1 rule will accomplish the  
same thing and provide even more "useful" data.

Accuracy and load were my thoughts. Since it's 1024: for ports I want to 
make sure that the minimum matching is being done on all that traffic. 
It's quite conceivable that benign traffic on high ports could start 
with a 220.

This way we have a nearly foolproof chain of events before we get a hit. 
No falses in theory...  and low load.



more rules == more work in every case.

The rule

alert tcp any 1024: -> $HOME_NET 1024: (msg:"BLEEDING-EDGE \
ATTACK_RESPONSE Off-Port FTP Without Banners - 220"; \
flow:established,to_server; dsize:6; content:"220 |0d 0a|"; offset:0; \
depth:6; flowbits:noalert; flowbits:set,ET.strippedftp220; \
sid: 2007714;  rev:1;)

has inherent overhead, adding rules on top of it doesn't help
performance. Qualifying with additional rules might help false positives
but packets *to server* are unlikely to fire in this chain anyway...
basically a client sending 220 \r\n only is probably rare unless
intentional.

If you want to post qualify events check out my latest SnortUnified.pm
with support for qualifiers  :)


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