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| Subject: | Re: [Snort-sigs] False positive sid:498 |
|---|---|
| Date: | Wed, 23 Mar 2005 13:19:24 -0600 (CST) |
On Tue, 22 Mar 2005, Paul Schmehl wrote:
Shouldn't this rule exclude port 25? /usr/local/share/snort/attack-responses.rules:alert ip any any -> any !25 (msg:"ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned root"; content:"uid=0|28|root|29|"; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:498; rev:6;)
Ah, but then you miss the reverse UNIX bindshell masquerading as an SMTP
client, which may be an acceptable risk in your environment. If you'd
prefer a different risk, you could use flowbits to define protocol-specific
"opaque" regions to be ignored by certain sigs:
# Ignore SMTP "DATA" from clients
alert tcp any any -> any 25
(msg:"SMTP DATA begun"; content: "|0D 0A|DATA|0D 0A|";
flowbits:set,opaque; flowbits:noalert; ...)
# Un-ignore SMTP client chatter
alert tcp any any -> any 25
(msg:"SMTP DATA ended CRLF.CRLF"; content "|0D 0A 2E 0D 0A|";
flowbits:unset,opaque; flowbits:noalert; ...)
# Ignore HTTP response bodies
alert tcp any 80 -> any any
(msg:"HTTP Response Headers Ended"; content "|0D 0A 0D 0A|";
flowbits:set,opaque; ...)
# Now, find our ATTACK-RESPONSES
alert tcp any any -> any any
(msg:"ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned root";
flowbits:isnotset,opaque; ...)
No more of those pesky security mailing lists tripping sigs via email and web
archives!
Because flowbits is generic, this approach sketched above is brittle (read:
F-Ns galore). What about rejected DATA commands from misbehaving clients,
so that "opaque" is never unset? What about pipelined HTTP requests? Etc.
It's hardly full-blown protocol awareness, but it is an option.
Regards,
Mike
--
Michael J. Pomraning, CISSP
Project Manager, Infrastructure
SecurePipe, Inc. - Managed Internet Security
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