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| Subject: | RE: [Snort-sigs] Suggestions for new attack response rules |
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| Date: | Thu, 2 Dec 2004 11:07:56 -0500 |
It's not simple, and it's certainly not perfect. (if we only allowed perfect rules, we'd have a lot fewer rules than we do) But even given that, I think it could be usefull. The primary utility lies in setting the flowbit for the http-based attacks. Given the following situations: 1) you don't have any web servers, you're just monitoring traffic out to the net in general. Then you would probably want to disable the 4 attack response rules, because the web servers "out there" aren't under your control, and you don't necessarily care if they're actually compromised, you primarily care if someone in the network that *is* under your control is trying to hack other people's boxes. 2) you do have webservers, all of which are well-behaved and use http status codes in appropriate ways. Wonderful, now you'll not only know when people attack, but when they succeed. 3) you have webservers that aren't quite standards compliant. For instance, I believe that IIS servers with a custom 404 page actually give a status of 200, but return the custom 404. This isn't too big a deal. Edit the 4 signatures for attack responses so that they will match anything that isn't your custom 404 page. Perhaps something like 'content:!"404 page not found"' or whatever suits your environment. 4) most of your webservers are compliant, but one or two are smoking crack, and can't be trusted to return meaningful status codes for anything. Add a suppression by_src for these rules, and only care about the alerts from your more well-behaved webservers. I just can't think of a case where these rules would actually be *bad*, and there are certainly quite a few places where they would be usefull. I guess the alternative is to use oinkmaster with a modification map for the 1K or so rules that I think need it to add the flowbits chunk. But I felt like this was a usefull enough thing that it would be worth adding to the main distribution. -Joe
-----Original Message----- From: Brian [mailto:bmc@snort.org] Sent: Wednesday, December 01, 2004 4:02 PM To: Joe Patterson Cc: snort-sigs@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Snort-sigs] Suggestions for new attack response rules On Wed, Dec 01, 2004 at 03:51:25PM -0500, Joe Patterson wrote:alert tcp any $HTTP_PORTS -> any any (msg:"ATTACK-RESPONSESUser attack OKresponse"; flow:from_server,established; pcre:"/^HTTP/1.1 (2|3)\d\d/"; flowbits:isset,http-user-attack; classtype:successful-user;)Yes, I've thought about this for a long time. Its not anywhere near as simple as you suggest. Look at how nessus handles error codes. MANY websites no longer use 200s for "good", and 300s & 400s for various errors, they use 200s for EVERYTHING. Sure, you might get a good feeling for the one or two sites you are looking at for reducing false positives. In the rest of the world, just looking at HTTP codes is NOT enough. Brian
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