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| Subject: | [Snort-sigs] sig 2671 |
|---|---|
| Date: | Fri, 12 Nov 2004 13:08:24 -0800 (PST) |
WEB-CLIENT bitmap BitmapOffset integer overflow attempt I'm getting a lot of alerts for this, from some pretty mainstream nets. 166.90.133.246 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 198.107.152.199 Verio, Inc. 209.246.22.102 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 209.249.114.36 Akamai 38.113.220.14 Performance Systems International Inc. 63.215.64.22 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 64.215.168.129 Global Crossing 68.237.164.137 Verizon Internet I suppose it's possible they are all hosting hostile web sites, but the websites I've found using .CHM exploits so far seem to be on much dodgier, off-brand providers. One file is us.yimg.com/i/tb/icons/qsbm.bmp yimg.com is owned by yahoo - so is Yahoo trying to pwn all 0ur b0x3n? Not by indirect means, I think. To the extent that I grok the exploit (courtesy http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2004-02/0806.html), a .bmp file with an offset value greater than a signed int can convey will give a buffer overflow in ie 5.x. I don't know the structure of bitmap files, so I'm not in a position to say whether the files on these sites represent an actual attempt to do evil. It looks like the file may have some problems - but it does display o.k. Mcafee triggers on the POC bitmap but does not on this one. Either mcafee is up to the usual tricks - using harmless POC for a too-specific signature or possibly they have a more useful, more specific understanding of the problem. Here's the partial packet (apologies in advance for borked formatting): 10:59:55.447926 209.246.22.88.80 > xxx.yyy.101.49.3018: P 4164933892:4164934476( 584) ack 2769532247 win 8576 (DF) (ttl 56, id 41497) 0000: 4500 0270 a219 4000 3806 a852 d1f6 1658 E..p".@.8.(RQv.X 0010: xxyy 6531 0050 0bca f83f d904 a513 b557 (.e1.P.Jx?Y.%.5W 0020: 5018 2180 7132 0000 4854 5450 2f31 2e30 P.!.q2..HTTP/1.0 0030: 2032 3030 204f 4b0d 0a43 6f6e 7465 6e74 200 OK..Content 0040: 2d54 7970 653a 2069 6d61 6765 2f62 6d70 -Type: image/bmp 0050: 0d0a 436f 6e74 656e 742d 4c65 6e67 7468 ..Content-Length 0060: 3a20 3337 320d 0a4c 6173 742d 4d6f 6469 : 372..Last-Modi 0070: 6669 6564 3a20 4672 692c 2031 3520 4170 fied: Fri, 15 Ap 0080: 7220 3139 3934 2030 303a 3030 3a30 3020 r 1994 00:00:00 0090: 474d 540d 0a44 6174 653a 204d 6f6e 2c20 GMT..Date: Mon, 00a0: 3038 204e 6f76 2032 3030 3420 3138 3a35 08 Nov 2004 18:5 00b0: 393a 3535 2047 4d54 0d0a 9:55 GMT.. Here's the packet that requested it: 10:59:55.421368 xxx.yyy.101.49.3018 > 209.246.22.88.80: P 2769532031:2769532247( 216) ack 4164933892 win 64240 (DF) (ttl 128, id 7916) 0000: 4500 0100 1eec 4000 8006 e4ef xxyy 6531 E....l@...do(.e1 0010: d1f6 1658 0bca 0050 a513 b47f f83f d904 Qv.X.J.P%.4.x?Y. 0020: 5018 faf0 ab71 0000 4745 5420 2f75 732e P.zp+q..GET /us. 0030: 7969 6d67 2e63 6f6d 2f69 2f74 622f 6963 yimg.com/i/tb/ic 0040: 6f6e 732f 7173 626d 2e62 6d70 2048 5454 ons/qsbm.bmp HTT 0050: 502f 312e 310d 0a41 6363 6570 743a 202a P/1.1..Accept: * 0060: 2f2a 0d0a 5573 6572 2d41 6765 6e74 3a20 /*..User-Agent: 0070: 4d6f 7a69 6c6c 612f 342e 3020 2863 6f6d Mozilla/4.0 (com 0080: 7061 7469 626c 653b 204d 5349 4520 362e patible; MSIE 6. 0090: 303b 2057 696e 646f 7773 204e 5420 352e 0; Windows NT 5. 00a0: 313b 202e 4e45 5420 434c 5220 312e 312e 1; .NET CLR 1.1. 00b0: 3433 3232 290d 0a48 6f73 4322)..Hos __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Check out the new Yahoo! Front Page. www.yahoo.com ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by: InterSystems CACHE FREE OODBMS DOWNLOAD - A multidimensional database that combines robust object and relational technologies, making it a perfect match for Java, C++,COM, XML, ODBC and JDBC. www.intersystems.com/match8 _______________________________________________ Snort-sigs mailing list Snort-sigs@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/snort-sigs
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