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| Subject: | RE: [Snort-sigs] False Positive for Probable Zafi Vrus outbound via SMTP rul |
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| Date: | Tue, 2 Nov 2004 11:32:34 -0800 |
We don't bounce back viruses, specifically because most of the sources are forged. I have received bounced forged messages myself and I agree that configuring your antivirus software to do this now days just contributes to the garbage traffic problem. It just so happens that in this case these messages were from a source that was listed in an open relay database and are therefore identified as SPAM before the antivirus software got to it. I was mistaken in that we no longer bounce back messages caught in our SPAM filter. We were doing this at one time because we wanted to notify senders that their message was rejected just in case it was erroneously identified as spam. We now deliver messages identified as spam to the intended user, in a segregated mail box that they themselves must check for false positives. (FALSE POSITIVES: These are important business e-mail messages that are caught by spam filtering software for a number of different reason. Unless you are sending your e-mail off to India to be pre-read by an army of human SPAM filters, SPAM filtering software is inherently prone to false positives.) Anyway after a more careful review, the reason for the Snort alerts on this rule is due to bounced messages that were created by a virus using randomly generated user names. These user names do not exist on our mail server so they are bounced back to the sender. I believe this would be an RFC compliance issue. -----Original Message----- From: Matt Jonkman [mailto:matt@infotex.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2004 11:07 AM To: Kalbfleisch, Gary Cc: snort-sigs@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Snort-sigs] False Positive for Probable Zafi Vrus outbound via SMTP rul <my 2 cents> Bouncing spam and viruses only compounds the problem. You'll be much better off discarding them, since the sender of most of them is spoofed, you'll be filling the inbox of unknowing random users. Bouncing a virus is just the same. Plus you're wasting more of your own bandwidth, as well as that of others. Don't mean to lecture, that's just a pet peeve of mine. If there's no possible reason the sender (even if the real sender were identified) would want the message back, then why waste bandwidth? You mention false positive sources, I'm curious what you mean there. In the case of viruses it's pretty clear cut, do you see falses on your AV scanner? </my 2 cents> But to the rule, it's intended to catch the virus on the way out of your net to help identify an infected machine inside. If you want to continue to bounce viruses I'd recommend putting in a local version of the same rule but make the source your mail server and make it a pass rather than alert. That would get rid of the undesired alerts. But I'd really recommend discarding spam and viruses. Better for everyone. :) We do appreciate you bringing up a discussion on a rule though. Keep them coming. Matt Kalbfleisch, Gary wrote:
This rule triggers an alert when the anti spam software on my mail servers bounces the messages back to the source. We have chosen to bounce back spam messages so "false positive" sources will get a
message
back rather than thinking that their message was delivered. alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any 25 (msg:"BLEEDING-EDGE Probable Zafi Virus Outbound via SMTP"; content:"TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAAUEUAAEwBAgBG"; content:"AAAAAAAADgAA8BCwEAAAAuAAAAOgAAAAAAAPu+"; distance:6; classtype:misc-activity; sid:2000310; rev:1;) Subject: [SPAM] Check this out kid!!! - Sending mail server found on relays.ordb.org -- Gary Kalbfleisch -- Director of Systems and Information Assurance -- Technology Support Services -- Shoreline Community College -- (206) 546-5813 -- (206) 546-6943 Fax
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