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| Subject: | Re: [Snort-sigs] SSH Scans Slightly off topic but related....... |
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| Date: | Wed, 08 Sep 2004 23:26:49 -0500 |
Federico Petronio wrote:
Brian wrote:
On Mon, Aug 23, 2004 at 01:17:00PM -0500, Matthew Jonkman wrote:
Seeing a ton of ssh brute force attempts against boxes all over the place. None successful since they're concentrating on root, but the rate is low enough that the portscan preprocessors aren't getting them (at the thresholds we usually use)
So I put this rule up on bleedingsnort.com:
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 22 (msg:"BLEEDING-EDGE Potential SSH Brute Force Attack"; flow:to_server,established; threshold:type limit, track by_dst, count 5, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:2001219; rev:1;)
5 ssh connects in 60 seconds from one source is generally unusual.
Except that isn't what your rule states. You are using by_dst, not by_src.
Your current rule states: if you see 5 connections to one destination within a 60 second window, alert.
uh... better hope you are not running a moderately used SSH server and using bleeding edge rules.
Actually I think none of those... I get some hits on this rule and read about "threshold" in Snort Manual.
As I understand, that rule talk about "alert ONLY in the first 5 events" (in both cases).
If we want "after 5 events in less than 60 seconds, generate an alert", I think the rule should be like:
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 22 ( sid: 2001219; rev: 2; msg: "BLEEDING-EDGE Potential SSH Brute Force Attack"; flow: to_server,established; flags: S; threshold: type threshold, track by_dst, count 5, seconds 60; classtype: attempted-dos;)
or
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 22 ( sid: 2001219; rev: 2; msg: "BLEEDING-EDGE Potential SSH Brute Force Attack"; flow: to_server,established; flags: S; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; classtype: attempted-dos;)
Saludos!
Thanks in advance. Jeff Price
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