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Network Security Snort-Signatures
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Re: [Snort-sigs] New idea in change tracking for nets

Subject: Re: [Snort-sigs] New idea in change tracking for nets
Date: Wed, 01 Sep 2004 03:06:32 -0500
Further (party pooper mode) aren't you getting a little into 'mission creep'?
Its only normal thing, but IDS should be "intrusion" detection, not detecting normal SOP
changes to infrastructure. Sure, you *can* do that but one would hope that
your normal change control process would have a feedback loop in the process
to accomidate that need. I am speaking from the standpoint of a 24/7 global
operation with strict change control process where such occurs only twice
a week (and flexible enough to realistically admit that sometimes its hard to
tell the difference daily in the amount of traffic from emergency changes and scheduled).
(Yes, unlike many others we officially do stuff twice a week instead of twice a month....!)


The mission of IDS should be to detect and react to abnormal, not to validate and
manage SOP.




Frank Knobbe wrote:

On Tue, 2004-08-31 at 22:49, Matt Jonkman wrote:


A new idea came our way to augment an organization's change control measures. We're writing signatures to track when devices on the network have config changes made remotely.

First step is routers and switches. Most are managed via telnet (even though ssh is better), and the configuration modes are easily recognizable.



Why do you need signatures for that? Can't normal profiling identify configuration/telnet attempts? When we profile networks, we construct a behavior matrix of what is normal and expected traffic, and alert on abnormal conditions. Such abnormal condition could be telnet access into a device from an non-authorized IP. That can be caught without a content based signature, and is therefore more flexible.

Further, why would you want to alert when a user has successfully
authenticated to a network component? Wouldn't you want to watch for
failed logon attempts instead of successful logons?

Another advantage in going the signature-less way is that you don't have
to assemble a ton of sigs for known devices (which still leaves the
unknown, or lesser known, devices out in the dark, such as an old
Wellfeet router or *gasp* a Motorola router, or something ...uhm...
antique. How about Ascend Pipelines? No wait, let me get a catalog and
inventory a comprehensive list of manufacturers first... :)

And then if you do have a signature set, you need to keep it maintained
as it can changed after firmware upgrades.


Before I sound too much of a party-pooper, I'll just leave with the
excuse of playing devils advocate. :)

Regards,
Frank



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