Well put Craig.
You made some good points regarding the so called "NON-Malicous attacks".
Robert L. Dixon, CSO
CHFI A+
State of West Virginia's
West Virginia Office of Techonology
Infrastructure Applications
Netware/GroupWise Administrator
Telephone: (304)-558-5472 ex.4225
Email:rdixon@workforcewv.org
"Craig Wright" <cwright@bdosyd.com.au> >>>
Hello,
There have been a large number of ill-informed posts regarding damage caused by
cyber-trespass. This is for the purpose of this post described as breaking into
a system with no clear intent to cause damage i.e. no Mens Rea or guilty mind.
I will exclude all references to intention to damage or wilful damage and limit
this to reckless damage alone.
Next, I will exclude Mens Rea as it may pertain to the fact that the act of
committing a computer crime is by definition illegal. We all seem to understand
that breaking into a computer without permission is a breach of the law so I
shall not explore this avenue of argument.
The term in law refers to "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea", which means that
"the act will not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. This is a common
defence in criminal cases though it will not help you in a civil tort case (i.e. civil
damages).
With the seeming ignorant state that exists (not to all reading) to the levels
of damage caused by breaking into systems and committing cyber-trespass I will
endeavour to detail the resultant state of affairs.
I will aim solely at corporate systems for the critique following. This is not
to state that Government, privately run or organisational systems have any
lesser effects resultant from attack, but that this is a post and not a
dissertation (though it is moving in that direction).
First we have the argument that has been fielded that at worst a system would
just need to be rebuilt. A prior poster stated that he would analyse his system
and track the incident. For the majority of the world this is not so simple.
Most people are not skilled in either incident response techniques or digital
forensic science (please note computer forensics is a misnomer and
grammatically incorrect). Nor are most companies able to afford to rebuild
systems on a regular basis for the fun of it.
Cyber-trespass leaves one in a state of doubt. It is commonly stated that the
only manner of recovery from a system compromise is to rebuild the host. I will
resist quoting a voluminous amount of material at this point (unless somebody
wishes to dispute this :). It is needless to say that documents, working papers
and processes on this topic are widely available. SANS, CERT and the CIS all
recommend that a compromised system be rebuilt, not from backup, but from
scratch.
Further one must "Resist the temptation of restoring from backups" *1 and complete an
"entire system install be performed from read-only distribution media".
So here, we have to look to the cost of both rebuilding the system and
recreating the data. In the modern corporation, the primary assets are often
vested in the intellectual capital of the firm.
First, the system needs to be rebuilt as was listed above. There is no argument
here (though I am willing to engage in one) over the need to rebuild the
system. The people at the company that was attacked do not and cannot know your
motives. They cannot assume you are benign, but have to assume that you are
malignant being that you are willing to break the law, that you are willing to
face gaol.
If they assume otherwise they will suffer again. How do they know that you have not
installed a rootkit? How is it known that there is no timebomb on the server. You as the
attacker have already demonstrated that you are not bound my conventional morality and
ethics. You have violated property rights, entered and penetrated a system, breached the
defences and raped the security of the site you choose as just "practice".
Every attacker that does this makes it easier for the truly malicious attacker
to succeed.
On top of this, add the loss due the unavailability, reputation and compliance
costs. Let us for the moment forget the costs of tort against the company. The
costs of action for a violation of privacy rights. The costs from a violation
of PCI-DSS. HIPPA Violations or the effects to the companies share price.
Costs. They seem to be all over the place when you actually think about it. Each of these costs is damage. This damage needs to be recovered. We all pay.
Now most organisations do not have, not can afford to retain skilled incident
response professionals. They need to employ external parties at a cost. Even
when they do have internal staff there is a cost, but the accounting process is
not so simple.
At rates (and this is based in Sydney, Australia) hiring personal from a
respected firm (and it is not likely to be less in the case of fear from an
attack driving firms to a position of trust) will have a charge out rate in the
order of $ 250-450 per hour. The investigation will take 10 -100 hours (and in
some cases longer though rare).
Is the cost of damages when placed against the risk worth it. I hope not, but
this is a personal risk decision for the individual to decide. I can do little
to stop you committing cyber-trespass just as I can do little to stop you
robbing a 7-11. Mind you however, I am a bit of an a*8hole. If I get involved I
will (in my personal time if needs be) map out every piece of information that
you have done and ensure that every lie you tell to try to worm out (aimed at
those who still try to do this act) of the consequences is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt in court.
Animus nocendi or a mind to harm reference the precise familiarity of illegal
content of behaviour, and of its possible consequences. Now that you have read
this post, it may be argued that you have come to understand that there are
consequences for your actions if you choose to still attack a system (aimed at
those who do). Please feel free to flame me as reading this post effectively
provides the essential condition to give a penal condemnation if you still
choose to violate the law by breaking into systems and causing damage.
Regards,
Craig
PS
So called.. NON-Malicous attacks have caused the following events to occur
1 Loss of human life (though systems damage)
2 Insolvancy and the resultant human costs (lost jobs, etc)
so much for no damage... PPS even longer rant as to each of these with
statistical data available ;)
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