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Network Security Security-Basics
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Re: Sender Spoofing via SMTP

Subject: Re: Sender Spoofing via SMTP
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2005 09:48:14 +0100
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Friday, November 11, 2005, 3:21:20 PM, Devdas Bhagat wrote:

I don't think there is a product on the market that would implement
such a strategy [I wish there was... maybe I'll write one some time
in the future? 8], which would have the following strategy applied:

Almost any MTA available today allows for this kind of policy.

I disagree. Not directly. Not MTA. This is usually scriptable and can
be achieved using an MDA such as Procmail. But not in a way that you
"turn on one option" in your MTA and it does all that I've described.

2. For an UNAUTHENTICATED user:
2.1. Check the domain in MAIL FROM against a list of your local
     domains
2.2. DENY the mail if it matches, since there should be no such case
     where an unauthenticated user is sending mail with your MAIL
     FROM.

Clue: .forward

.forward is MDA-level, not MTA. Additionally, how would you suppose to
check using .forward, whether the user has authenticated or not, if
most MTAs add no headers to inform the MDA or MUA that the user has
indeed authenticated? Besides - why receive the whole message, queue
it and use up all the resources, if this can be done BEFORE the
message is received, at envelope level?

2.3. Additionally, if possible, also check the domain in From: header
     in the DATA section, before queueing it, and do the same as
     above.

Clue: Mailing lists.

The fact that they use such a technique does not mean it can directly
be used in the MTA before accepting the mail.

3. For an AUTHENTICATED user [SMTP AUTH]:

3.1. Check whether the username given in the SMTP AUTH dialogue
     matches the username given in MAIL FROM and later From: headers.
     If it doesn't, deny mail. This might be problematic, if you have
     for example a user who wants to send mail as boss@yourdomain.com,
     whilst the account name is johndoe@yourdomain.com [boss is an
     alias], therefore an alternative method could be used:

I can think of a few dozen reasons to use different addresses
legitimately (clue: role accounts).

Hence the alternative for those who must use those different
addresses.

3.2. Replace the MAIL FROM header with the true account name and valid
     domain for that account name, and possibly add a separate header
     [or at the end of the From: header] stating "(Authenticated as
     johndoe)". This will then make it clearly visible, who actually
     sent the mail [because that person must have authenticated].

Exposing internal username information, allowing easier attempts at
bruteforcing passwords. You might want to dump this to syslog only.

Clue: most MTAs these days allow for using different usernames and
passwords in the SMTP AUTH dialogue. It's enough to set up uniquely
identifying usernames for all your users and give them different
passwords, and this strategy will not expose anything.

- --
Tomasz Nidecki, Sekr. Redakcji / Managing Editor
hakin9 magazine            http://www.hakin9.org
mailto:tonid@hakin9.org      jid:tonid@tonid.net

Do you know what "hacker" means?
http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/hacker-howto.html

Czy wiesz, co znaczy slowo "haker"?
http://www.jtz.org.pl/Inne/hacker-howto-pl.html

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