But I should have thought that if the PKCS12 certificate is password
protected, then it would still ask for the export password each time
you make use of it, wouldn't it?
So even if you gain access to the desktop, you would still be unable
to make use of the cert for client auth or any other purpose, makng
the web access impossible.
Hope this helps,
Rodrigo.
On 4/28/05, Justin Roysdon <justin@roysdon.net> wrote:
Last I checked, if someone has local access to your system, then it's not
very difficult to change your password (with a boot disk) and then proceed
to login as your user. It sounds like a poor way to authenticate.
The benefit of the seperate authentication is lost.
Crypto Geek
---------- Original Message -----------
From: "Keenan Smith" <kc_smith@clark.net>
To: <security-basics@securityfocus.com>
Sent: Wed, 27 Apr 2005 11:12:02 -0400
Subject: Secure web site access and PKI Certs
All,
I have access to a secure web site. It used to require a PKI Cert to
identify the user and then a standard username/password login to
authenticate.
Recently a change was made to the site that allows the supplying of a
PKI Subject CN Fragment to a user "profile" on the site. In this
case, the certificate not only identifies the user but authenticates
as well.
The end result is an "auto-login" feature that in effect, keeps me
logged in all the time. Anybody sitting at my machine and logged in
as me (Windows XP) can access the web site as me.
At first glance this seems like it's a reasonable way to accomplish a
secure access to the web site. Installing the certificate as me
ties it to my profile and makes it unavailable to other users on my
machine and since the use of the certificate requires a user to
login as me, it moves the authentication piece from the web site to
the Windows domain.
This seems to some extent like "security through obscurity" and also
substituting convenience for security, an all-to-common problem.
Since it's my security-cleared neck on the line, I'd rather be too
concerned rather than not concerned enough.
So I'm asking the collective wisdom of the list to consider. Is
PKI's single sign-on capability reasonable? Is this implementation
adequate?
Thoughts? Opinions? Critiques?
Thanks
Keenan Smith
------- End of Original Message -------
