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Network Security Security-Basics
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Re: Hidden windows ports, files and services.

Subject: Re: Hidden windows ports, files and services.
Date: 16 Feb 2005 15:13:42 -0000
In-Reply-To: <D7A3023590B2B94FAFDBDCAA6735ED94120DC4@banana-jr-6k-2k.nmefdn.org>

How should I say this.........................................

      NUKE IT
      FDISK IT
      DOD WIPE IT
      BEAT THE HDD WITH A HAMMER

Sorry couldn't help it.  If the system was on line unprotected and
mis-configured for six months as you say the box is 100% owned. 

First off, I'm not sure that you can say that with certainty.  Sure, it may 
look like that based on the information that Alex is feeding us, but take a 
good hard look at what's going on.  If you assume that Alex is a locked-on hard 
charger (which I'm sure he is) with a clue (based on some of his responses, 
there is some uncertainty about this - no disrespect intended), then sure, you 
can say that it's likely that the box is owned.

However, it's taken multiple posts to the lists, and I've sent emails to Alex, 
several of which have not had responses.  So we're getting a little bit of info 
here and there, rather than one big dump.  It's pretty evident that Alex has no 
methodology for data collection and analysis in support of IR ops.

For example, look at this:
"I did run TASKLIST before without "/SVC" The processes are invisible to this 
command."

Rather than dumping the output of several commands to files and zipping them 
up, Alex is saying, I don't see anything unusual.  Well, what's unusual?  Paul 
might be able to spot something "unusual" right away, where Alex wouldn't see 
it.  It's pretty clear to me from reading this list that lots of stuff goes 
unnoticed, and all the author has to do is change the name of the file.

Alex also said "Using "msconfig", I disabled sys.ini and win.ini...".  But 
we're talking about XP...XP doesn't use those files (it's "system.ini", not 
"sys.ini"), as they're legacy support for 16-bit apps.  The rest of Alex's 
response in that particular post show a random, hodge-podge, trial and error 
approach.  

The point of this is that the viability of the info being posted to this list 
about the incident is at question.  Too many times, someone will say, "I ran 
<insert tool here>, and didn't see anything suspicious", without really knowing 
what constitutes "suspicious".  

Kudos to Alex, though, for doing *something*.

And to Paul's comment...before nuking/beating/abusing the hard drive, one might 
want to consider beating/abusing/tazing/re-educating/retraining the admin who 
set the system up in the first place.  After all, which is less trustworthy?  
The poor, dumb hard drive just does what you tell it to do...

H. Carvey
"Windows Forensics and Incident Recovery"
http://www.windows-ir.com
http://windowsir.blogspot.com

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