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Network Security Secure-Shell
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RE: Deliberately create slow SSH response?

Subject: RE: Deliberately create slow SSH response?
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2008 10:08:24 -0600
Hi all,

Actually, Kevin's idea makes sense: for a good password, a brute force attack 
easily reaches 100 000 attempts. Who will have the patience to wait 3 million 
seconds? That's more than 34 days of continuous attack. 30 seconds delay before 
requesting the password will discourage 99% of the script kiddies.

Best regards,

George Iacob

-----Original Message-----
From: listbounce@securityfocus.com [mailto:listbounce@securityfocus.com] On 
Behalf Of Sergio Castro
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2008 11:53
To: 'Fromm, Stephen (NIH/NIMH) [C]'; 'Zembower, Kevin'; 
secureshell@securityfocus.com
Subject: RE: Deliberately create slow SSH response?

Sure, by logic the attack will slow down. It won't prevent continuous attacks 
though. So my suggestion is, if the service is used only by certain IPs, then 
filter all others.

 

-----Mensaje original-----
De: Fromm, Stephen (NIH/NIMH) [C] [mailto:fromms@mail.nih.gov] Enviado el: 
Jueves, 10 de Julio de 2008 12:51 p.m.
Para: Sergio Castro; Zembower, Kevin; secureshell@securityfocus.com
Asunto: RE: Deliberately create slow SSH response?

Yes, but if the attacker is coming from one point and takes 30 seconds for each 
attempt, versus 0.03 seconds...

Stephen J. Fromm, PhD
Contractor, NIMH/MAP
(301) 451-9265
 
 

-----Original Message-----
From: Sergio Castro [mailto:sergio.castro@unicin.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 1:15 PM
To: 'Zembower, Kevin'; secureshell@securityfocus.com
Subject: RE: Deliberately create slow SSH response?

The brute force attacks are most likely automated, so if your objective is to 
bore a human to death with 30 second delays, it wont' work.

Have you thought about limiting access to the service to only certain IPs?

- Sergio 

-----Mensaje original-----
De: listbounce@securityfocus.com [mailto:listbounce@securityfocus.com] En 
nombre de Zembower, Kevin Enviado el: Miércoles, 09 de Julio de 2008 11:56 a.m.
Para: secureshell@securityfocus.com
Asunto: Deliberately create slow SSH response?

This might seem like a strange question to ask, but is there a way to 
deliberately create a slow response to an SSH request? I'm annoyed at the large 
number of distributed SSH brute-force attacks on a server I administer, trying 
to guess the password for 'root' and other accounts.
I think that my server is pretty secure; doesn't allow root to log in through 
SSH, only a restricted number of accounts are allowed SSH access, with I think 
pretty good passwords. But still, the attempts annoy me.

I wouldn't mind if SSH took say 30 seconds to ask me for my password.
This would slow the attempts. Is there any way to configure OpenSSH to do this? 
I searched the archives of this group with 'slow' and 'delay'
but didn't come up with anything on this topic. Please point it out to me if I 
overlooked anything. In addition, I can limit the number of SSH connections to 
3-5 and still operate okay. 

Ultimately, I need this solution for hosts running OpenSSH_3.9p1 under RHEL ES 
4 and OpenSSH_4.3p2 under Debian 'etch' 4.0 and Fedora Core 6.

Thanks in advance for your advice and suggestions.

-Kevin

Kevin Zembower
Internet Services Group manager
Center for Communication Programs
Bloomberg School of Public Health
Johns Hopkins University
111 Market Place, Suite 310
Baltimore, Maryland  21202
410-659-6139 


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