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Network Security Secure-Shell
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Re: Illegal user ssh probes

Subject: Re: Illegal user ssh probes
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 20:02:11 +0200
On 19-10-2004 at 09:24:51PM -0700, Calvin Maready wrote:
CM> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
CM> Hash: SHA1
CM> 
CM> In the last 2 months or so i've seen alot of these too, except i also get 
root 
CM> attempts. on k-otiks site they have a brute forcing script for ssh that i 
CM> think that a number of these scans are coming from even though it was only 
CM> release on the 20th of last month. Here is the direct link 
CM> http://www.k-otik.com/exploits/08202004.brutessh2.c.php .
CM> On Saturday 16 October 2004 21:05, Christopher Strong wrote:
CM> > In-Reply-To: <002f01c4a2d2$e0056ba0$6301010a@CPQ7380>
CM> >
CM> > >On examining /var/log/secure for several firewalls I manage remotely 
using
CM> > >ssh I have observed a recurrent pattern of probing over the last several
CM> > >that attempts to connect using user id's in the following order...
CM> > >
CM> > >test / guest / admin / admin / user / test
CM> >
CM> > I am seeing this, along with random usernames in large blocks from
CM> > compromised IPs
CM> >
CM> > >Is it worth reporting the behaviour to the net block assignees in case
CM> > > they aren't aware their server might be compromised?
CM> >
CM> > Usually not.  They are generally fools who won't reply, or if they do they
CM> > will blow you off.
CM> 

Use this:
http://www.bmk.bz/log-auth-check/index.html

works fine for me.

Best regards,
   Bartek.

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