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| Subject: | Re: What do you take for secure programming? |
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| Date: | Thu, 5 May 2005 18:13:25 -0300 |
I ougth to agree with out in many aspects. But probably the sense of this thread has been lost. Although ACM said is nearly impossible to write correct software, i have a very good experience write them. Yes, i don't strictly formaly speaking, no formal systems that axiomize counting is complete. So, even engineer have no FORMAL method to garantee a building won't follow. Neverthless there plenty of them very confident on the result of their work. I believe i prior exposure to Kurt Godel would clarify that. Anyhow. What you said about large project i agree with. But i am in the arena of writing very specific tools, like my version of database competitor for BDB, My kerberos implementation, my telnet server, my NIS project, and the like. I am writing them alone, i am confident enough for such. I do not write down my specification in a strictly formal manner, but i have formal perspective in mind. And that, dude, that makes a real difference. I have some already done tools i have been using in stressing environment. They works like pretty well, no downtime, no performance bottleneck that could not be achieved before by similar software ... I think you are right, these method does not scale well. The more the number of fellows in any given software the lower its quality, at least that's my experience. But i have seen large project that are gide by people that have no ideia about what they were doing. Much of the problems that put even higher pressure on release dates was because of software per se, but because of incompetence. That leads to higher and higher increase in software complexity. since nobody really know what to do, they fired everywhere and after started working to cure the bullets damage (remenber, bullets theyselfs shot). Funny, isn't it? I believe i am coherent, all i can say is that they works for me alone, because i use them. The results of such approach may be seen by the users of my software. Whether they works for large team project or not, i don't know. At least i hope when you say they don't, this may be justified by your own experience trying to use them, and if it did not work you are supposed to be sure it was a faulty of the method itself and no other variable like, incompetent developers, no familiarity with that method, and the like. Just my two cents. On 5/5/05, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
On Thu, 05 May 2005 13:54:57 -0300, Gustavo Rios said:Altough is very hard to be 100% rigorous, they all - no exception - helps a lot. For those interested in doing serious secure programming, i am confident to suggest them, if you would allow. Important to know these books is all about about programming, not about coding, i.e., no particular language syntax is taken into place.The single biggest problem with all these "rigorous development" disciplines is that they *are* very hard. And this runs into two different yet related problems: 1) Doing a rigorous formal analysis of a program like TeX, which is merely huge but comprised of merely sequential processing, is bad enough. Trying to do a formal analysis of the things that *need* it (for instance, the Linux kernel, the Firefox browser) quickly becomes very intractable, as there's all these nasty timeouts and race conditions and locking issues on SMP machines and even having to deal with hardware errors... Did I mention device drivers for poorly or even erroneously documented hardware, where you're writing formally correct code to totally borked specifications, which will never actually function because the hardware has different ideas? (There's 4 errata in the x86 family that are severe enough that Linux even lists in /proc/cpuinfo whether your processor is prone to it, and the work-around deployed: fdiv_bug, hlt_bug, f00f_bug, and coma_bug). And we'll overlook what happens to rigorously proven numerical algorithms when run on a Pentium chip that has the rounding issues.... It's also infamously difficult to ensure that you're not writing to a specification that, while correct, does something totally stupid. For instance, consider this infamous "thinko" at Hotmail/Passport: http://www.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/VulnWatch/2003-05/0010.html You read it, and you hit your forehead with your hand and do a Homeresque "D'Oh!". But then you realize that this was obviously *not* something they had thought of testing - which meant it almost certainly wasn't in the design spec either. So no amount of formal analysis will detect the proper implementation of a broken design...PS: As soon as i have some result to show, i may post a url for those to play with my software.Exactly. This brings me to: 2) This may work for small single-person efforts. It's generally considered unacceptable for large projects, which tend to have these ugly issues called "target release dates"..... Other than those issues, it's a great idea. ;)
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