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| Subject: | RE: Account Lockouts |
|---|---|
| Date: | Mon, 6 Dec 2004 17:48:26 -0800 |
From: The Amazing Dragon [mailto:ehem@cs.pdx.edu] Sent: Monday, 06 December, 2004 01:22
Using SIRDS as a transformation might be pretty effective against current recognizers.
I've never had any luck at seeing SIRDS pseudo-images, and I know other people who've had similar difficulty. I suspect that SIRDS would exclude too many users.
Might be interesting to use patterns similar to color-blindness tests, but then you need to be able to count on someone to be color-sensitive (though you can then use this as secondary protection, color-blind get a different answer).
Thanks. I'm colorblind (weak green response), too. (On the other hand, I rarely forget my passwords...) And the different mechanism for colorblind users will either be easier to recognize than the color-discrimination one, in which case the attacker can target it, or harder, in which case why not use it for everyone?
This still only works as long as someone doesn't produce an OCR that recognizes them. Only a matter of time.
Indeed. And it offers no additional strength against human-assisted attacks, which are probably easier to mount anyway. CAPTCHAs (what a godawful name) are inherently flawed. They were created to distinguish between human users and programs. That distinction turns out to be of relatively little value for security in most of the contexts where CAPTCHAs are being deployed. CAPTCHAs try to address the wrong problem. -- Michael Wojcik Principal Software Systems Developer, Micro Focus
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