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| Subject: | Re: "Selling" a code-audit. |
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| Date: | Tue, 21 Sep 2004 11:20:23 +0100 |
Jason Coombs PivX Solutions said the following on Mon, Sep 20, 2004 at 07:39:54AM -1000, [..]
It does appear ironic and absurd for management to then punish the developers for meeting the schedule by having a code audit pick apart all the things the developers were forced to skip over in order to finish on time.
Where are you getting this assumption from the original mail? I read and reread and found no evidence of it. Apart from the fact that developers make lots of security mistakes without realising, it is not a given that speed over quality will be prioritised (rightly or wrongly from a competitive point of view).
The developers themselves can show you those things, since they probably have them all memorized and documented.
Man, I want to audit this team's stuff. Where do they exist?
Now, if you are able to point out things that the developers truly did not already know so that they learn something new, if you are able to document, for the developers' benefit in their relationship with management, mistakes and skipped steps and lack of understanding or lack of devotion to security on the part of management at the same time, and in a balanced manner with a presentation of indisputable facts, then developers will love you and management will love you and both will gain new leverage in their ongoing relationship with the other.
I find this very difficult to believe. Has it often worked for you like this in the past? Pointing out management mistakes as opposed to just developer mistakes means that you're also running the risk of pissing off management and therefore risking not getting the buy in you need from them to continue to carry out the audits. There are enough mentions of this phenomenon in the books/articles I've read of this sort of reaction to lead me to think that it is not just limited to my own experience.
If you are being asked to do code audits rather than forensic audits that examine anything and everything your expertise guides you to examine, then you are being manipulated by people who think that security is all about finding the mistakes made by others rather than perfecting security starting with themselves.
There's room for (and a purpose to) both. If we go back to your assumption that the development team don't have time to fix known flaws then it seems slightly contradictory to now suggest that they have time to perfect security (not that I've heard of anyone doing this anyway). In that instance it is either more practical (because the developers don't have the skills themselves) or more economical (by deciding to employ someone to point out the low hanging fruit) to get someone to do a code audit of a certain level of detail. Of course, it's more economical and practical in the long term to instruct the developers in how to avoid and detect such flaws, but it doesn't sound like the original poster has that good a relationship with the team to build up this sort of process effectively. Perhaps I disagree so much because we live in different worlds. If you inhabit companies where the development teams are this skilled and all problems are down to pressures of time and failings of management, then this all seems perfectly sound, but I don't think that most of the world is there yet. [earlier]
Then, instead of rushing to ship the code (remember Microsoft's motto in the Netscape wars 'he who ships first, wins') the company with proper security culture would second guess itself and remove half the code and reduce the features and turn everything off by default and be absolutely certain that the code that does ship does not expose, by default, any attack surface.
Microsoft won that browser war didn't they? I'd not fancy trying to convince Microsoft (or any other company for that matter) that they should change their priorities unless there's a financial or competitive advantage in the short, medium or long term. -- ejrry^[bxpZZ
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