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Re: Vulnerability Assessment

Subject: Re: Vulnerability Assessment
Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2007 09:09:45 +0000
 Pete,

Thanks for your obviously experienced and well-considered response.

I agree with you that the 'Risk' is useful for helping make controls decisions 
based on budget and standards requirements. I helped write some of those 
standards (NIST, and no, it's not my fault - I was just one of a team)...

In a 'perfect' world, risk would not matter - any and every point of 
vulnerability would be discovered and mitigated. Heck, in a perfect world, the 
owrd 'mitigation' would not exist - instead each and every point would be 
'corrected' or 'secured'.

I also agree that every point of vulnerability should be included - even the 50 
bazillion file permission problems that show up (and skew the automated graph 
reports when using automated OS vulnerability tools on an application-oriented 
establishment are worth including in the *data*.

I would suggest that one of the differentiators between an automated report and 
what a true, experienced vuln. ass. pro can offer is that of bringing some 
rationality to the panic that ensues in most shops when the administration sees 
how truly open they are.

I would suggest that one of the guiding factors for 'mitigation and other 
'recommendations' (you know, the second-to-last part of a good vulnerability 
assesment report, not included in the automated tool returns because of the 
human judgment factor required... <smile>) is, in fact, related to actual risk. 
Sometimes this even has a relationship to any existing Risk Assesment 
documentation...

IMHO, therefore, I prefer to list ALL the vulnerabilities but prioritize fixes 
based on my perception of the risk of that vulnerability being exploited in 
that environment.

And yes - tha would include addressing the potential for damage done by 
accidental breached, internal and otherwise.
--
CSO 
InfoSec Group 
703-626-6516 



-------------- Original message from Pete Herzog <lists@isecom.org>: 
-------------- 


Hi Dave, 

A final point is that concentric layers of protection have to be understood 
from a risk perspective; in that a vulnerability which requires local login 
to 
exploit, or physical presence (ALMOST ANY MACHINE) may be more or less at 
risk 
if the employees are trusted and trustable, and the physical access is more 
ore 
less controlled. In other words, if a Financial Server or Top Secret Server 
is 
running an MS Operating system (already a questionable practice ), and is 
protected behind umpteen firewalls, AV, IDS/IPS, it may be more vulnerable if 
any joe could just walk up to it physically and do something like boot it up 
on 
CD (BackTrax it) or less vulnerable if there is no unauthorized physical 
access 
and the keyboard and monitor are controlled. 

Your points before this one are well taken and I do hope some people learn 
from the DoS mistake of yours you mentioned. 

Risk is a concept for choosing security and controls. Testing, however, is 
verifying to what level that security or those controls exist. To test, 
you don't make a risk assessment. Doing so would restrict your findings. 
You make a thorough test of everything within the business requirements, 
policy, regulations, etc. Remember, you're there to make sure they didn't 
forget anything. You can't do that if you're making the same guesses they 
are. That's why the OSSTMM can help you not miss anything. 

In terms of analysis, where you need to trust employees or not, I think you 
make a good point about risk but it's the wrong thing to do. Even the most 
loyal employee can send the wrong mail by accident to the wrong person or 
be fooled into clicking on the phisher's link. You need to treat every 
interaction on the network as one of a business perspective where security 
provides a means to efficiency, less accidents, and a quicker reaction to 
mistakes. In that case it's not about who you trust inside or out but what 
you need to keep the business running efficiently. If locking down all the 
desktops means less help desk hassles (it doesn't) versus the cost of 
employee turn-over from unhappy employees, then make your decision that 
way. Not whether or not you trust Alice or Jack. If you really think we 
can make good trust choices as human beings, just watch a few daytime talk 
shows ;) 

-pete. 

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