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| Subject: | RE: 3rd party vuln assesment firms |
|---|---|
| Date: | Wed, 28 Dec 2005 08:31:42 -0600 |
Disabling CDP is a WONDERFUL idea, but unfortunately the use of Cisco IP phones needs this service enabled Chris Serafin IT Security / Voice Engineer chris@chrisserafin.com -----Original Message----- From: Roland Dobbins [mailto:rdobbins@cisco.com] Sent: Wednesday, December 28, 2005 12:05 AM To: pen-test@securityfocus.com Subject: Re: 3rd party vuln assesment firms From an operational security perspective, I'd strongly suggest reconsidering a blanket disablement of CDP. You're absolutely correct, one should disable CDP at the peering edge, customer edge, IDC edge, and access edge - any untrusted edge, which really means *any* edge. But up through distribution/ aggregation and core, one can actually end up having a negative impact on the security of one's network by disabling CDP in those non- edge portions of the topology; when one's in the middle of a big incident and jumping hop-by-hop and needs to be able to readily see what one's neighbor devices are, it's invaluable and saves lots of time when working to resolve the issue at hand. If a network operator finds himself in a situation in which he's disabled CDP on all his edges, he's left it enabled deeper in the toplogy and an attacker is *still* in a position to be able to see it anyways (i.e., can log into the distribution/aggregation/core network infrastructure and/or sniff traffic from those links), he in all probability has bigger problems than worrying about CDP, and losing the visibility it affords in non-edge portions of the network doesn't contribute the the overall security posture of the network infrastructure; quite the opposite. On Dec 27, 2005, at 1:26 PM, raven@oneeyedcrow.net wrote:
recommending that you disable CDP when it's not in diagnostic use
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Roland Dobbins <rdobbins@cisco.com> // 408.527.6376 voice
Everything has been said. But nobody listens.
-- Roger Shattuck
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website. Up to 75% of cyber attacks are launched on shopping carts, forms,
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