Fundamentally, VoIP is not secure, as originally stated, It depends
on what an organization is attempting to validate. Network security
consulting practices will attempt to dazzle an organization with
their "VoIP assessment or VoIP Readiness services" . Some
concentrate more on VoIP network readiness and propose bandwidth
analysis utilizing tools that either home grown or commercial. This
may provide some insight on jitter, latency and other such issues
when implementing or migrating to a VoIP infrastructure. Discussion
of security issues arise when "former security investigators" or "Ph
D" types get involved in the discussion and start rattling
off statements "As telephone communications move to the IP world, it
will become increasingly easier to intercept and monitor telephone
calls by anyone." and "How businesses handle threats to their
converged network will be crucial to their success." Great buzzword
statements, but they miss the questions that an organization may have
r egarding the underlying security of VoIP and the various aspects of
enabling options that allow for availability and ease of use for end users.
At 11:24 AM 7/20/2005, Bob Bell \(rtbell\) wrote:
Mark, Intel96 -
There are a lot of conflicting opinions floating around as to the
security of VoIP systems. One of the things that you need to do is
establish whether you are dealing with a bounded system, (i.e. an
enterprise PBX replacement) or an unbounded one (i.e. SKYPE) as they
have considerable differences in both their vulnerability and the
resources available to deal with issues. Secondly, security of VoIP is
not a single dimensional problem. Many of the issues of protecting VoIP
occur a layers far below the application layer which is where VoIP
lives. So, you need to examine the issue from a systems approach not
simply a point solution for VoIP. Finally, there is a great deal more to
providing SYSTEMIC protection beyond simply protecting the protocol.
This includes things like the provisioning of the endpoints, the control
of and validation of the images contained in the endpoints, the
authentication and authorization schemes for the endpoints and users,
etc. If I can be of help, please feel free to contact me.
Bob
IPCBU Security Architect
Cisco Systems, Inc.
576 S. Brentwood Ln.
Bountiful, UT 84010
801-294-3034 (v)
801-294-3023 (f)
801-971-4200 (c)
rtbell@cisco.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mark Teicher [mailto:mht3@earthlink.net]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 16:40
> To: intel96
> Cc: pen-test@securityfocus.com
> Subject: Re: VoIP Assessment
>
> What specific items have you been tasked to validate?
> Could be as simple as :
> Are the components VoIP capable?
> If so, then what protocols have been
> implemented (Y/N)
> If x protocol, if implemented correctly
> (i.e when enabled, does it process the traffic correctly (Y/N)
> If x protocol, if implemented
> correctly (i.e. when x protocol is disabled, does it block
> VoIP traffic inbound/outbound? (Y/N)
>
> and so and so on
>
> Lots of those "security" type experts will overstate the
> obvious and start rattling off big words like MITM attacks,
> Resource exhaustion,
> H.323 attacks, SIP Overflow attacks, etc, etc, but IMHO,
> simplify what the tasks are, and break those tasks into
> simple steps that any former senior security consultant can
> do by utilizing a checklist approach, otherwise one gets into
> the battle with the "puffed out chest security wannabes "
>
> /m
> At 01:40 PM 7/19/2005, intel96 wrote:
> >I have been asked to look at the security of a VoIP
> architecture. Has
> >anyone conducted a security assessment against VoIP or the
> components
> >that make up the architecture?
> >
> >Thanks,
> >
> >Intel96
>
