Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | Re: Privelege separation |
|---|---|
| Date: | Tue, 24 Aug 2004 16:46:11 -0500 |
On Tue, 2004-08-24 at 22:26:29 +0200, Michel Arboi proclaimed...
No, this comes from a security *giver*. Believe it or not, I never got a cent for what I did for this project. I did not ask either. Consider me as a fucking communist if this pleases you.
What's wrong with the communists?
I have too much Mediterranean blood.
Cute.
In fact, there is no such thing as "absolute" security. And applying general principles is good as long as it does not hurt... other general principles. For example, complexity is the enemy of security. Splitting Nessus into several parts will increase the code complexity and the number of bugs. And also, general principles are not worth a good risk analysis.
Yes thanks, I think we're all aware of this. Nor was I trying to school you in computer security, I was simply relating my point for those folks here who don't get why the hell we'd want privsep in the first place. Clearly, if you've written more than a hello, world, you understand how privsep would be beneficial.
I have already said what I considered the main risks about Nessus. The soft point is the OpenSSL library, because it is the biggest and more complex part of code. Protect the client / server communication with TCP wrappers, and you'll solve most of the problems.
The point I'm making is that I'd like to see more protections against the folks who are actually authorized to use it; do I trust Joe-Admin who scans his network 15 times an hour (his /20, at that) to not be an idiot? No. Yes, OpenSSL is one large conglameration of mish-mash. But hey, that's a whole other story - I'm not looking for you to tell me where the problems-by-proxy are.
If the OpenSSL client code is vulnerable to some "reverse attack", the bad guy could take control of the nessusd server. Whether he is root or not does not matter: he can nuke your whole network. Privsep won't help.
So you're saying that role permissions in nessus do not actually work?
So what? You want to do it for Nessus? Submit a patch and stop pissing me off. This is _free_ and _open_ software. You are allowed to code, to test, to suggest new ideas, not to insult me.
Indeed I am, and I'm working on some stuff to get at least the listener privsep'ed.
No. Not clearly.
I have large glasses. _______________________________________________ Nessus mailing list Nessus@list.nessus.org http://mail.nessus.org/mailman/listinfo/nessus
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | Suggetion for better explanation for smb_virii.nasl, Jason Haar |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | Re: netstat scanner, Pavel Kankovsky |
| Previous by Thread: | Re: Privelege separation, Michel Arboi |
| Next by Thread: | Re: Privelege separation, Michel Arboi |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |