Re: Privelege separation

On Tue, 2004-08-24 at 16:57:25 +0200, Michel Arboi proclaimed...

> Indeed. For FreeBSD, try jails (not as good as a OS MAC, but better
> than nothing). For Solaris, buy Trusted Solaris. etc.
>
> We have already talked about this privilege separation stuff, and
> my opinion is that it does not really improve the security (whatever
> this word means). 

Wow, uh. This comes from a security vendor? The whole idea behind
privsep is that the *least* amount of code runs as root. OpenBSD has
done it for tcpdump, syslogd, etc. So you open up a raw socket, then
for to a child who communicates through some fancy mechanism to
request further privilege-required capabilities. Perhaps this would
protect nessus itself from an overflow that might pop up in the
future; after all, no code is perfect.

Then again, it's your product! :-) and clearly it needs to be
protected by other mechanisms. I just wish, personally, that I could
put nessus on the network and not require 3-4 other layers of
defense in front of it.

Cheers,

- Eric
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