Drew Copley wrote:
... ... ... ... ... ..., and, ... ... ...
Drew,
That such long and detailed explanations rationalizing, defending, and
disputing disclosure policies, and correcting innacurate allegations concerning
one's disclosure practices of the past, are necessary at all is proof that
there are only two options: black or white.
There are no gray areas when it comes to disclosure. Disclosure is something
that good people do. Non-disclosure is something that bad people do. Be careful
with asserting that there are lines somewhere in a gray area over which people
should not step, for any such line is going to be a moving target, at best, and
move right on past you while you are standing still, at worst, creating a
condition where your own disclosures appear to have been malicious when viewed
in retrospect.
To disclose, or not to disclose. That is the question.
If somebody of technical skill who has chosen disclosure decides that the
circumstances warrant immediate full disclosure with proof of concept, then
that is the action that must be taken. To do otherwise would be to go against
one's own conscience, the core of which is already proved 'good' by the fact of
the decision to disclose.
The longer one chooses non-disclosure, and the more willfully one does so, the
less 'good' that disclosure appears - particularly after considering all of the
technical truths about information security research and reverse engineering
that you so carefully and corectly articulated.
Immediate full disclosure that cannot be disputed and leaves no room for debate
immediately helps anyone who chooses to receive and consider the disclosure.
Everything else serves only to delay and obscure that clear and urgent security
alert communique, increasing the window of exposure and the Total Risk of
Ownership needlessly.
Sincerely,
Jason Coombs
jasonc@science.org
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
