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| Subject: | Re: kerberos! |
|---|---|
| Date: | Fri, 10 Sep 2004 08:45:21 -0400 |
Far too many people replied with "this is expected behavior", for my comfort
level.
When MS created NTLMv2, in response primarily to MITM attack threats to NTLM,
we had a thread here regarding the inability for a company who was using
systems that could do NTLMv2 to prevent fall-back. So MS had provided a
solution to a real problem, but had not provided any way to ensure the problem
could not happen again. They subsequently came up with the ability to restrict
both client and server authentication requirements ("LMCompatabilityLevels".)
That registry key also solved another problem, the ability to put weak LM
hashes in the SAM, by restricting clients that couldn't do stronger
authentication techniques.
Nesha's post brings to light (or recasts the spotlight) on the very same issue.
With the introduction of Kerberos, there should have been some mechanism
provided whereby non-Kerberos authentication could be excluded from working at
all.
That fall-back authentication has always been in NT should not translate into
an inability for more security-minded organizations to eliminate it from their
environments. This was precisely the argument made that led to
"LMCompatabilityLevel", and it should have been remembered when Kerberos was
implemented.
So, tsk tsk to all of you who simply responded with "this is expected
behavior". It shouldn't be expected, it should only happen if, after
implementing Kerberos, you specifically choose to allow NTLM fall-back. That
would be the more secure process, *that* should be the "expected behavior",
IMNSHO.
Legacy support is the next issue that MS needs to tackle IMO. Default secure
may well be the norm now for Windows Servers, and hopefully will be the norm
for Longhorn. Legacy disabled should become the default too.
Cheers,
Russ - Senior Scientist - TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor
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