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| Subject: | RE: A bit strange ARP queries |
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| Date: | Mon, 19 Dec 2005 12:48:28 -0500 |
I have seen and used similar techniques for health checking of a server: check a static ARP entry by sending an ARP request for the server's IP to the MAC I trust. This (to a degree) overcomes IP conflicts and ARP hijacking. We did this to produce a failover mechanism - the backup unit would directly ARP it's primary, and failing to hear a response, would broadcast a gratuitous ARP taking control of the primary's address (better living through ARP spoofing?). This was before we started using VRRP. This could also be a method of discovering faulty configurations versus bad user behavior. For example, if my ARP monitoring notices two or three machines MACs using the same source IP, this ARP would tell us if the activity was a misconfiguration of the machines' nic, or if it was the result of spoofing software. Since the IP address may not be bound to the interface (just put in promisc mode and told to process layer3 traffic), a negative response may indicate the IP was used by a process that's no longer active. A positive response might be someone adding an IP they weren't supposed to use. This isn't fool-proof (or even a safe assumption) since it's trivial to overcome... -Dave -----Original Message----- From: Eygene A. Ryabinkin [mailto:rea@rea.mbslab.kiae.ru] Sent: Friday, December 16, 2005 7:27 AM To: wayne dawson Cc: incidents@securityfocus.com; paul.farrington@goldmedal.co.uk Subject: Re: A bit strange ARP queries I can be wrong, but I can not imagine the unsolicited ARP requests. As for replies it is OK, but requests? But I worried by the fact that arp who-has packets have the target MAC in it (that is supposed to be discovered by the request) and this MAC changes from time to time. RFC says that the target MAC in the who-has requests has no meaning but they can be present in the who-has requests. And there was no such packets in that net -- they appeared recently. So if the terget MAC is normally ignored, such packets can be used for ARP spoofing (of any kind) only if we have some strange ARP stacks that are caching the target MAC's from the ARP requests. What is wrong in my thoughts? Thanks! -- rea
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