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| Subject: | [Full-disclosure] CAT6500 accessible via 127.0.0.x loopback addresses |
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| Date: | Wed, 26 Sep 2007 14:17:18 -0400 |
Lee E Rian/TCO/HQ/BOC wrote on 08/29/2006 01:49:40 PM:
I found something interesting w/ the cat6000s - telnet 127.0.0.11 gets you into the switch & telnet 127.0.0.12 gets you into the router % snmpget 127.0.0.11 sysDescr.0 RFC1213-MIB::sysDescr.0 = STRING: "Cisco Systems WS-C6509.Cisco Catalyst Operating System Software, Version 5.5(18).Copyright (c) 1995-2002 by Cisco Systems."
<.. snip ..>
I'm trying to figure out if that opens us up to something or not.
Yes, the date is correct - it was a bit over a year ago when I wrote a co-worker about the problem. And it did open us up to an attacker gaining access to the router or switch; I sent a msg to Cisco PSIRT the same day. Cisco has documented the fix in the release notes (eg. http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat6000/122sx/ol_4164.htm#wp3511819) but it's buried in the release notes and how many people will a) read the release notes and b) realize the implications? So while I agree with Cisco about this being a low to moderate vulnerability, that's only if one realizes that the various line cards in a catalyst 6500 are accessible via 127.0.0.xx addresses from the network. At least in my mind, this is on the same level as routers accepting snmp sets to 255.255.255.255, {network, 0} and {network, -1} ... a minor issue as long as you realize that it is possible to access the router/switch that way. Mitigating factors: - an attacker would still need to know/guess the snmp community string or userid/password - only the first cat6000 with an MSFC in the path can be accessed this way As an example of 'only the first MSFC in the path', the path from one of our remote offices to a data center is cat6500 with a supervisor 2 card (no MSFC) cisco 2800 router cisco 7200 router cat6500 with a SUP720 in slot 5 Anyone in that remote office would have been able to access the data center cat6500 by sending traffic to 127.0.0.51. I would like to thank Ilker Temir of Cisco for his professionalism and many courtesies extended to me while working on this issue. Lee Rian _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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