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Re: [Full-disclosure] Hash

Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Hash
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2007 09:05:23 -0600
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On 27-Jul-07, at 7:49 AM, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:

On Thu, 26 Jul 2007 18:23:37 MDT, Tremaine Lea said:

Apparently you've never heard of a mail administrator tagging
outbound email for all users. It's pretty common.  Of course, you may
lack the experience of dealing with large companies.

The fact a large company does it doesn't make it any less stupid.   
And you
think a large company could afford their own mailserver rather than  
making their
people use Gmail (now wrap your head around the concept of  
"confidential mail
anywhere *near* a Google-owned server"... ;)

I was as amused by that as you.



To pick up on a part of the sig that Nick didn't rip into publicly:

"and delete it from your system"

Presumably, Tremaine, in his self-claimed role as "Security  
Consultant"
*and* "Paranoia for hire", realizes that it quite likely sat on my  
site's main
mail server for anywhere from several seconds to several hours (in  
fact, there
are probably copies on *3* different servers in our mail cluster) -  
and that
until some *other* piece of mail happens to land on those same  
blocks of storage,
the text is quite easy to recover by any decent computer forensics  
practitioner.

Yes, I do realize this.  Duh.



On the other hand, actually going in and overwriting the affected  
block(s) is
quite challenging, especially when it's a 10 terabyte mailstore  
handling
several million messages a day for 100K users.  We'll be happy to  
do it - *IF*
Tremaine's company is willing to indemnify us for the downtime.

Why would I (or the company I contract to) be interested in what you  
do to delete Sergio's email?



So there's 2 possible outcomes here:

1) The request has zero legal standing, and Tremaine's company is  
relying on
the kindness of strangers rather than using PGP or S/MIME to  
actually secure
their mail.  This sort of thing is usually called "lack of due  
diligence",
and I don't think any company wants to be flaunting it.

Speaking of due diligence...  I'm pretty sure literacy and following  
a trail of information is basic to this field.  As you've clearly  
missed, Sergio has nothing to do with me, the company I work with,  
or ... hell, who knows.  I don't know the guy from Adam.  Or you.



2) The request *does* have legal standing - in which case  
Tremaine's company
may indeed have some liability to pick up any and all associated  
costs.


Again with the not being able to follow the bouncing ball.


Particularly interesting is the legal question of what happens when a
"please delete all copies" request is attached to something that's  
sent to
a company that is required to retain copies of *everything* for  
regulatory
compliance (as is true for some financial-sector companies).....

That's the only really interesting thing you've contributed, and it's  
a good question.  Any one know of any court cases on this?

- ---
Tremaine Lea
Network Security Consultant
Intrepid ACL
"Paranoia for hire"


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