I'm sorry, this looks to me like plain CSRF against web interfaces of
intranet network devices. If someone knows your router's password
(i.e.: default password) and the router's HTTP requests are NOT
tokenized (vulnerable to CSRF), then an attacker can most certainly do
anything on your behalf by tricking you to visit an evil webpage.
Changing DNS settings is just one of the many evil things you could
do. Others include changing password to a new one (DoS to legitimate
router admin user), exposing the admin web interface to the Internet,
disabling security, exposing internal hosts to the Internet through
port-forwarding, etc...
Of course, if the web interface is designed really badly you might not
even need a password to CSRF it. Some of you might recall the CSRF
issue on Linksys WRT54g reported by Ginsu Rabbit back in August 2006
which allowed you to turn off the security of the device completely.
Ginsu Rabbit's Advisory:
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/442452/30/0/threaded
PoC for the vuln:
http://ikwt.com/projects/linksys/linksys-unauth-csrf.html
CSRFing intranet devices research published in the past:
http://www.whitehatsec.com/home/resources/presentations/files/javascript_malware.pdf
Am I missing something guys?
On 2/16/07, Fabian (Lists) <lists@sevenlayers.org> wrote:
Larry Seltzer wrote:
This "response" doesn't seem to address any Linksys (and therefore
Cisco) routers, does it?
Seems so... Maybe because they are not IOS based and therefore not real
"Cisco Routers" as we all know them?
--Fabian
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