With any luck, not too much. The point is that there is a way to do it, and
if there is a way, someone will use it in a bad manner eventually.
We can only hope that the users will count more on vulnerability/behavior
based security solutions, and not exploit based security solutions.
-- Aviv.
-----Original Message-----
From: Pukhraj Singh [mailto:pukhraj.singh@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 7:37 AM
To: avivra
Cc: karmic_nirvana@yahoo.com; EArsal@techdata.de;
full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] VML Exploit vs. AV/IPS/IDS signatures
And you tell me how many of these variants you will actually find in
the wild. Won't be a significant number I bet.
Cheers!
Pukhraj
On 9/27/06, avivra <avivra@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi,
i.e. I can't afford to buy "specialized" security tools/devices for
"speclialized" attacks unless my company relies heavily on web/content
services.
So, you will buy "specialized" security tools like firewall or
Anti-Virus, but not web content filtering tool?
In our company, we established a information-sharing
network with other security companies. So the real-time exploit-facing
signatures were then subjected to live traffic, honeypots and countless
variants; They seemed to work out pretty well.
I would like to see how your real-time signatures get updated with the
randomization implemented in the new VML metasploit module. Your
"countless" exploit variants will become really innumerable.
The problem is that the signatures are written for the exploit, and
not for the vulnerability.
-- Aviv.
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