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| Subject: | RE: [Full-disclosure] Secure OWA |
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| Date: | Wed, 30 Aug 2006 11:00:18 -0400 |
-----Original Message----- From: Brendan Dolan-Gavitt [mailto:mooyix@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2006 9:58 AM To: Renshaw, Rick (C.) Cc: Dude VanWinkle; Adriel Desautels; full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Secure OWA
On 8/30/06, Renshaw, Rick (C.) <rrenshaw@ford.com> wrote:-----Original Message----- From: full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk [mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Dude VanWinkle Sent: Saturday, August 26, 2006 2:30 PM To: Adriel Desautels Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Secure OWAThe only real fault I know about is the fact that you can guess passwordseternally without locking out user accounts. There's two sides to this risk. If you allow OWA logins to lock out accounts, and your OWA page is available from anywhere on the Internet, you are handing an easy DOS tool to anyone that knows the account names for people on your server.
Perhaps. But a temporary lockout period would deter brute-force attempts while still making an attacker do some work to keep the accounts locked (eg, if you have a lockout of 5 minutes, brute forcing is no longer practical, but at the same time, if you want to DoS someone's account you have to keep coming back every 5 minutes. And that increases the risk you'll get caught.)
-Brendan
My point was not matter which way you go on this issue, there is some risk. The only thing that you can do is balance one risk against the other and find the point where you feel comfortable with the risks. You could implement something like an exponential backoff wait between failed logins without lockouts, which would make it more difficult to brute-force the account, but there are ways around that too. At the end of the day, you have to pick which risk you are more comfortable dealing with, brute-force attacks or DOS attacks. Personally, I'd take the DOS, because it's better than allowing passwords to be brute-forced (in my mind). Rick
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