Re: [Full-disclosure] Secure OWA

On 8/30/06, Renshaw, Rick (C.) <rrenshaw@ford.com> wrote:
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk
> [mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Dude
> VanWinkle
> Sent: Saturday, August 26, 2006 2:30 PM
> To: Adriel Desautels
> Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Secure OWA
>
> > The only real fault I know about is the fact that you can guess passwords
> eternally without locking out user accounts.
>
> There's two sides to this risk.  If you allow OWA logins to lock out
> accounts, and your OWA page is available from anywhere on the Internet, you
> are handing an easy DOS tool to anyone that knows the account names for
> people on your server.

Perhaps. But a temporary lockout period would deter brute-force
attempts while still making an attacker do some work to keep the
accounts locked (eg, if you have a lockout of 5 minutes, brute forcing
is no longer practical, but at the same time, if you want to DoS
someone's account you have to keep coming back every 5 minutes. And
that increases the risk you'll get caught.)

-Brendan

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