Why didn't I even try, you say? Past experiences of numerous
researchers
aside, consider this: Microsoft takes 3-6 months to fix critical but
non-public vulnerabilities in their flagship software (some of these
flaws
must've been independently discovered by the rogues, hence putting
customers at great risk, or at best taking chances). This is not a
reasonable timeframe, compared to industry averages. Yet, they only
take
2-4 weeks to fix publicly disclosed bugs - thus making software safer,
sooner.
Nice of you to make that risk assessment for the entire IA community.
Thanks.
You're making an argument for no disclosure and no accountability...
...by saying that it sucks for infosec workers to have to do some
actual
work, rush workarounds, write IDS signatures - based not on guesses,
but on useful information...
...and you're making this argument On a full disclosure mailing list.
Bravo.
I have made no such arguments. My argument is that a responsible
researcher should give the vendor a chance to respond. If they don't
within a reasonable amount time, publish the vulnerability and document
the vendor's lack of response. Further, releasing a zero-day
vulnerability without giving a vendor any chance to respond does more
harm than good. That's my argument.
Sorry to crash the party here, but you guys aren't going to be able
release zero-day exploits without getting some flak from the folks who
have to respond to them. Free speech goes both ways, you know.
I'd say we're at a point of agreement on disagreeing at this point.
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