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| Subject: | [Full-disclosure] [Re:] Interesting but vulnerable scheme for tokenless auth |
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| Date: | Wed, 26 Apr 2006 20:06:39 -0700 |
Glenn, There are a few parts of this I am confused on.
In the cert is a private key. If the system were required to contact a "backend" server first, passing it perhaps a cipher containing its serial number encrypted with its private key and its identity, the
When you say pass a 'cipher' do you mean pass a message? And if you mean pass a message then a public/private crypto system would encrypt this message using the backend servers public key, not its own private key. Or perhaps I have misread your posting.
server could send back a (hopefully unique to that cert) decryption key that would decrypt the private key, allowing its use; the code at the PC would need to erase the cleartext private key when done. The server
Sending of any keys over the air like this is dangerous, thats what makes public/private crypto systems good. The only drawback is you need a good PKI to support those users and be the CA. The CA is the only authority the system should 'trust' when it comes to certificate validation and revocation. Which means a second 'backend' server may not fit well into this picture.
could check the serial number matched the "identity" (it would have the public key) to prevent a simple search of the server for these encrypting keys.
I am not sure I understand this last part, please elaborate. ---------------------------------------- Chris Key ID: 7E8DE44E info@delsec.net ---------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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