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| Subject: | [Full-disclosure] Re: Multiple Vendor Anti-Virus Software Detection Evasion Vulnerability through forged magic byte |
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| Date: | Thu, 27 Oct 2005 04:51:00 -0500 |
Dear Ken,
If your altered virus sample still executes correctly, you have simply created a new virus variant.
Not exactly, please look at this virustotal.com log http://www.securityelf.org/updmagic.html
That is my point, if you still think that your product is OK - do not do anything.
Regards, Andrey Bayora.
Quoting "Williams, James K" <James.Williams@ca.com>:
Subject: Re: Multiple Vendor Anti-Virus Software Detection Evasion Vulnerability through forged magic byte From: "Andrey Bayora" <andrey () securityelf ! org> Date: 2005-10-25 3:07:51
[...]
VULNERABLE vendors and software (tested):
[...]
3. eTrust CA (ver 7.0.1.4, engine 11.9.1, vir sig. 9229)
[...] DESCRIPTION:
The problem exists in the scanning engine - in the routine that determines the file type. If some file types (file types tested are .BAT, .HTML and .EML) changed to have the MAGIC BYTE of the EXE files (MZ) at the beginning, then many antivirus programs will be unable to detect the malicious file. It will break the normal flow of the antivirus scanning and many existent and future viruses will be undetected.
Andrey,
Thank you for the report.
You are effectively altering existing viruses to the point that AV scanners do not detect them. If your altered virus sample still executes correctly, you have simply created a new virus variant. If your altered virus sample does not execute properly, you have created nothing more than a corrupt virus sample.
Consequently, the issue that you describe is *not* a vulnerability issue, but rather just an example of a new variant that has not yet been added to an AV vendor's database of "known viruses".
Note that CA eTrust Antivirus, when running in Reviewer mode, should already detect these new variants.
Regards, Ken
Ken Williams ; Dir. Vuln Research Computer Associates ; 0xE2941985
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